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Abstract
The Group Activity Selection Problem (GASP) models situations where a group of agents needs to
be distributed to a set of activities while taking into account preferences of the agents w.r.t. individual
activities and activity sizes. The problem, along with its two previously proposed variants sGASP and
gGASP, has been studied in the parameterized complexity setting with various parameterizations, such
as number of agents, number of activities and solution size. However, the complexity of the problem
parameterized by the number of types of agents, a parameter motivated and proposed already in the
paper that introduced GASP, has so far remained open.
In this paper we establish the complexity map for GASP, sGASP and gGASP when the number of
types of agents is the parameter. Our positive results, consisting of one fixed-parameter algorithm and
one XP algorithm, rely on a combination of novel Subset Summachinery (which may be of general inter-
est) and identifying certain compression steps which allow us to focus on solutions which are “acyclic”.
These algorithms are complemented by matching lower bounds, which among others answer an open
question of Gupta, Roy, Saurabh and Zehavi (2017). In this direction, the techniques used to establish
W[1]-hardness of sGASP are of particular interest: as an intermediate step, we use Sidon sequences to
show the W[1]-hardness of a highly restricted variant of multi-dimensional Subset Sum, which may find
applications in other settings as well.
1 Introduction
In this paper we consider the GROUP ACTIVITY SELECTION PROBLEM (GASP) together with its two most
prominent variants, the SIMPLE GROUP ACTIVITY SELECTION PROBLEM (SGASP), and the GROUP AC-
TIVITY SELECTION PROBLEM WITH GRAPH STRUCTURE (gGASP) [6, 18]. Since their introduction, these
problems have become the focal point of extensive research [3, 4, 5, 19, 15, 16]. In GASP one is given a
set of agents, a set of activities, and a set of preferences for each agent in the form of a complete transitive
relation (also called the preference list) over the set of pairs consisting of an activity a and a number s,
expressing the willingness of the agent to participate in the activity a if it has s participants. The aim is
to find a “good” assignment from agents to activities subject to certain rationality and stability conditions.
Specifically, an assignment is individually rational if agents that are assigned to an activity prefer this out-
come over not being assigned to any activity, and an assignment is (Nash) stable if every agent prefers its
current assignment over moving to any other activity. In this way GASP captures a wide range of real-life
situations such as event organization and work delegation.
SGASP is a simplified variant of GASP where the preferences of agents are expressed in terms of ap-
proval sets containing (activity,size) pairs instead of preference lists. In essence SGASP is GASP where
each preference list has only two equivalence classes: the class of the approved (activity,size) pairs (which
contains all pairs that are preferred over not being assigned to any activity), and the class of disapproved
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(activity,size) pairs (all possible remaining pairs). On the other hand, gGASP is a generalization of GASP
where one is additionally given an undirected graph (network) on the set of all agents that can be employed
to model for instance acquaintanceship or physical distance between agents. Crucially, in gGASP one only
considers assignments for which the subnetwork induced by all agents assigned to some activity is con-
nected. Note that if the network forms a complete graph, then gGASP is equivalent to the underlying GASP
instance.
Related Work. SGASP, GASP, and gGASP, are known to be NP-complete even in very restricted set-
tings [6, 18, 15, 16]. It is therefore natural to study these problems through the lens of parameterized
complexity [8, 2]. Apart from parameterizing by the solution size (i.e., the number of agents assigned to
any activity in a solution) [19], the perhaps most prominent parameterizations thus far have been the num-
ber of activities, the number of agents, and in the case of gGASP structural parameterizations tied to the
structure of the network such as treewidth [6, 18, 15, 9]. Consequently, the parameterized complexity of all
three variants of GASP w.r.t. the number of activities and/or the number of agents is now almost completely
understood.
Computing a stable assignment for a given instance of GASP is known to be W[1]-hard and contained
in XP parameterized by either the number of activities [6, 18] or the number of agents [18] and known to be
fixed-parameter tractable parameterized by both parameters [18]. Even though it has never been explicitly
stated, the same results also hold for gGASP when parameterizing by the number of agents as well as
when using both parameters. This is because both the XP algorithm for the number of agents as well as
the fixed-parameter algorithm for both parameters essentially brute-force over every possible assignment
and are hence also able to find a solution for gGASP. Moreover, the fact that gGASP generalizes GASP
implies that the W[1]-hardness result for the number of agents also carries over to gGASP. On the other
hand, if we consider the number of activities as a parameter then gGASP turns out to be harder than GASP:
Gupta et al. ([15]) showed that gGASP is NP-complete even when restricted to instances with a single
activity. The hardness of gGASP has inspired a series of tractability results [15, 18] obtained by employing
additional restrictions on the structure of the network. One prominent result in this direction has been
recently obtained by Gupta et al. ([15]), showing that gGASP is fixed-parameter tractable parameterized by
the number of activities if the network has constant treewidth. For SGASP, it was recently shown that the
problem is also W[1]-hard when parameterized by the number of activities [9], and hence the only small
gap left was the complexity of this problem parameterized by the number of agents. For completeness, we
resolve this question in our concluding remarks by giving a fixed-parameter algorithm.
Already with the introduction of GASP [6] the authors argued that instead of putting restrictions on the
total number of agents, which can be very large in general, it might be much more useful to consider the
number of distinct types of agents. It is easy to imagine a setting with large groups of agents that share the
same preferences (for instance due to inherent limitations of how preferences are collected). In contrast to
the related parameter number of activity types, where it is known that SGASP remains NP-complete even
for a constant number of activity types [6], the complexity of the problems parameterized by the number of
agent types (with or without restricting the number of activities) has remained wide open thus far.
Our Results. In this paper we obtain a complete classification of the complexity of GASP and its variants
SGASP and gGASP when parameterized by the number of agent types (t) alone, and also when parameterized
by t plus the number of activities (a). In particular, for each of the considered problems and parameteri-
zations, we determine whether the problem is in FPT, or W[1]-hard and in XP, or paraNP-hard. One dis-
tinguishing feature of our lower- and upper-bound results is that they make heavy use of novel Subset-Sum
machinery. Below, we provide a high-level summary of the individual results presented in the paper.
Result 1. SGASP is fixed-parameter tractable when parameterized by t+ a.
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This is the only fixed-parameter tractability result presented in the paper, and is essentially tight: it
was recently shown that SGASP is W[1]-hard when parameterized by a alone [9], and the W[1]-hardness
of the problem when parameterized by t is obtained in this paper. Our first step towards obtaining the
desired fixed-parameter algorithm for SGASP is to show that every YES-instance has a solution which is
acyclic—in particular, a solution with no cycles formed by interactions between activities and agent types
(captured in terms of the incidence graph G of an assignment). This is proved via the identification of
certain compression steps which can be applied on a solution in order to remove cycles.
Once we show that it suffices to focus on acyclic solutions, we branch over all acyclic incidence graphs
(i.e., all acyclic edge sets of G); for each such edge set, we can reduce the problem of determining whether
there exists an assignment realizing this edge set to a variant of SUBSET SUM embedded in a tree structure.
The last missing piece is then to show that this problem, which we call TREE SUBSET SUM, is polynomial-
time tractable; this is done via dynamic programming, whereas each step boils down to solving a simplified
variant of SUBSET SUM.
Result 2. SGASP is W[1]-hard when parameterized by t.
Our second result complements Result 1. As a crucial intermediate step towards Result 2, we obtain the
W[1]-hardness of a variant of SUBSET SUM with three distinct “ingredients”:
1. Partitioning: items are partitioned into sets, and precisely one item must be selected from each set,
2. Multidimensionality: each item is a d-dimensional vector (d being the parameter) where the aim is
to hit the target value for each component, and
3. Simplicity: each vector contains precisely one non-zero component.
We call this problem SIMPLE MULTIDIMENSIONAL PARTITIONED SUBSET SUM (SMPSS). Note that
SMPSS is closely related to MULTIDIMENSIONAL SUBSET SUM (MSS), which (as one would expect)
merely enhances SUBSET SUM via Ingredient 2. MSS has recently been used to establish W[1]-hardness
for parameterizations of EDGE DISJOINT PATHS [13] and BOUNDED DEGREE VERTEX DELETION [12].
However, Ingredient 1 and especially Ingredient 3 are critical requirements for our reduction to work, and
establishing the W[1]-hardness of SMPSS was the main challenge on the way towards the desired lower-
bound result for SGASP. Since MSS has already been successfully used to obtain lower-bound results and
SMPSS is a much more powerful tool in this regard, we believe that SMPSS will find applications in
establishing lower bounds for other problems in the future.
Result 3. GASP is in XP when parameterized by t.
This is the only XP result required for our complexity map, as it implies XP algorithms for SGASP parame-
terized by t and for GASP parameterized by t + a. We note that the techniques used to obtain Result 3 are
disjoint from those used for Result 1; in particular, our first step is to reduce GASP parameterized by t to
solving “XP-many” instances of SGASP parameterized by t. This is achieved by showing that once we know
a “least preferred alternative” for every agent type that is active in an assignment, then the GASP instance
becomes significantly easier—and, in particular, can be reduced to a (slightly modified version of) SGASP.
It is interesting to note that the result provides a significant conceptual improvement over the known brute
force algorithm for GASP parameterized by the number of agents which enumerates all possible assignments
of agents to activities [17, Theorem 3] (see also [16]): instead of guessing an assignment for all agents, one
merely needs to guess a least preferred alternative for every agent type.
The second part of our journey towards Result 3 focuses on obtaining an XP algorithm for SGASP
parameterized by t. This algorithm has two components. Initially, we show that in this setting one can
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reduce SGASP to the problem of finding an assignment which is individually rational (i.e., without the
stability condition) and satisfies some additional minor properties. To find such an assignment, we once
again make use of SUBSET SUM: in particular, we develop an XP algorithm for the MPSS problem (i.e.,
SUBSET SUM enhanced by ingredients 1 and 2) and apply a final reduction from finding an individually
rational assignment to MPSS.
Result 4. GASP is W[1]-hard when parameterized by t+ a.
Result 5. gGASP is W[1]-hard when parameterized by t + a and the vertex cover number [11] of the
network.
The final two results are hardness reductions which represent the last pieces of the presented complexity
map. Both are obtained via reductions from PARTITIONED CLIQUE (also called MULTICOLORED CLIQUE
in the literature [2]), and both reductions essentially use k+
(
k
2
)
activities whose sizes encode the vertices and
edges forming a k-clique. The main challenge lies in the design of (a bounded number of) agent types whose
preference lists ensure that the chosen vertices are indeed endpoints of the chosen edges. The reduction for
gGASP then becomes even more involved, as it can only employ a limited number of connections between
the agents in order to ensure that vertex cover of the network is bounded.
We note that Result 5 answers an open question raised by Gupta, Roy, Saurabh and Zehavi [15], who
showed that gGASP is fixed-parameter tractable parameterized by the number of activities if the network has
constant treewidth and wondered whether their result can be improved to a more efficient fixed-parameter
algorithm parameterized by the number of activities and treewidth. In this sense, our hardness result repre-
sents a substantial shift of the boundaries of (in)tractability: in addition to the setting of Gupta et al., it also
rules out the use of agent types as a parameter and replaces treewidth by the more restrictive vertex cover
number.
An overview of our results in the context of related work is provided in Table 1.
Organization of the Paper. After introducing the required preliminaries in Section 2, we present all of
our Subset Sum machinery in the dedicated Section 3. Each subsequent Section i ≤ 8 then focuses on
obtaining Result i− 3.
2 Preliminaries
For an integer i, we let [i] = {1, 2, . . . , i} and [i]0 = [i] ∪ {0}. We denote by N the set of natural numbers,
by N0 the set N ∪ {0}. For a set S and an integer k, we denote by S
k and 2S the set of all k dimensional
vectors over S and the set of all subsets of S, respectively. For a vector p¯ of integers, we use |p¯| to denote
the sum of its elements.
We refer to the handbook by Diestel ([7]) for standard graph terminology. The vertex cover number of a
graph G is the size of a minimum vertex cover of G.
2.1 Parameterized Complexity
In parameterized algorithmics [8, 2, 20] the run-time of an algorithm is studied with respect to a parameter
k ∈ N0 and input size n. The basic idea is to find a parameter that describes the structure of the instance
such that the combinatorial explosion can be confined to this parameter. In this respect, the most favourable
complexity class is FPT (fixed-parameter tractable) which contains all problems that can be decided by an
algorithm running in time f(k) ·nO(1), where f is a computable function. Algorithms with this running time
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Parameterization Lower Bound Upper Bound
SGASP
n
1FPT0
GASP aW[1]a XP
gGASP W[1] aXPa
SGASP
a
bW[1]b XP
GASP W[1] aXPa
gGASP cparaNPc
SGASP
n+ a FPTdGASP
gGASP
SGASP
t
2W[1]2 XP
GASP W[1] 3XP3
gGASP cparaNPc
SGASP
t+ a
1FPT1
GASP 4W[1]4 XP
gGASP cparaNPc
gGASP t+ a+ vc (or t+ a+ tw) 5W[1]5 XPc
Table 1: Lower and upper bounds for SGASP, GASP, and gGASP parameterized by the number of agents (n), agent
types (t), and the number of activities (a). In the case of gGASP, also the parameters vertex cover number (vc) and
treewidth (tw) of the network are considered. Entries in bold are shown in this paper, and the numbers 1 to 5 in the
upper index are used to identify results 1 to 5. The result marked with 0 is provided in the concluding remarks.
References: a is [18], b is [9], c is [15], d is folklore.
are called fixed-parameter algorithms. A less favourable outcome is an XP algorithm, which is an algorithm
running in time O(nf(k)); problems admitting such algorithms belong to the class XP.
To obtain our lower bounds, we will need the notion of a parameterized reduction. Formally, a parame-
terized problem is a subset of Σ∗ × N, where Σ is the input alphabet. Let L1 ⊆ Σ
∗
1 × N and L2 ⊆ Σ
∗
2 × N
be parameterized problems. A parameterized reduction (or FPT-reduction) from L1 to L2 is a mapping
P : Σ∗1 × N → Σ
∗
2 × N such that (i) (x, k) ∈ L1 iff P (x, k) ∈ L2, (ii) the mapping can be computed by
an FPT-algorithm w.r.t. parameter k, and (iii) there is a computable function g such that k′ ≤ g(k), where
(x′, k′) = P (x, k).
Finally, we introduce the complexity class used to describe our lower bounds. The class W[1] cap-
tures parameterized intractability and contains all problems that are FPT-reducible to INDEPENDENT SET
(parameterized by solution size).
2.2 Group Activity Selection.
The task in the GROUP ACTIVITY SELECTION PROBLEM (GASP) is to compute a stable assignment π from
a given setN of agents to a setA of activities, where each agent participates in at most one activity inA. The
assignment π is (Nash) stable if and only if it is individually rational and no agent has an NS-deviation to
any other activity (both of these stability rules are defined in the next paragraph). We use a dummy activity
a∅ to capture all those agents that do not participate in any activity in A and denote by A
∗ the set A ∪ {a∅}.
Thus, an assignment π is a mapping from N to A∗, and for an activity a ∈ A we use π−1(a) to denote the
set of agents assigned to a by π; we set |π−1(a∅)| = 1 if there is at least one agent assigned to a∅ and 0
otherwise.
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The set X of alternatives is defined as X = (A × [|N |]) ∪ {(a∅, 1)}. Each agent is associated with
its own preferences defined on the set X. In the case of the standard GASP problem, an instance I is of
the form (N,A, (n)n∈N ) where each agent n is associated with a complete transitive preference relation
(list) n over the set X. An assignment π is individually rational if for every agent n ∈ N it holds that
if π(n) = a and a 6= a∅, then (a, |π
−1(a)|) n (a∅, 1) (i.e., n weakly prefers staying in a over moving
to a∅). An agent n where π(n) = a is defined to have an NS-deviation to a different activity a
′ in A if
(a′, |π−1(a′)| + 1) ≻n (a, |π
−1(a)|) (i.e., n prefers moving to an activity a′ over staying in a). The task in
GASP is to compute a stable assignment.
gGASP is defined analogously to GASP, however where one is additionally given a set L of links L ⊆
{{n, n′} | n, n′ ∈ N ∧ n 6= n′ } between the agents on the input; specifically, L can be viewed as a set
of undirected edges and (N,L) as a simple undirected graph. In gGASP, the task is to find an assignment
π which is not only stable but also connected; formally, for every a ∈ A the set of agents π−1(a) induces
a connected subgraph of (N,L). Moreover, an agent n ∈ N only has an NS-deviation to some activity
a 6= π(n) if (in addition to the conditions for NS-deviations defined above) n has an edge to at least one
agent in π−1(a).
In SGASP, an instance I is of the form (N,A, (Pn)n∈N ), where each agent has an approval set Pn ⊆
X \{(a∅, 1)} of preferences (instead of an ordered preference list). We denote by Pn(a) the set { i | (a, i) ∈
Pn } for an activity a ∈ A. An assignment π : N → A
∗ is said to be individually rational if every agent
n ∈ N satisfied the following: if π(n) = a and a 6= a∅, then |π
−1(a)| ∈ Pn(a). Further, an agent n ∈ N
where π(n) = a∅, is said to have an NS-deviation to an activity a in A if (|π
−1(a)|+ 1) ∈ Pn(a).
We now introduce the notions and definitions required for our main parameter of interest, the “number
of agent types”. We say that two agents n and n′ in N have the same agent type if they have the same
preferences. To be specific, Pn = Pn′ for SGASP and n=n′ for GASP and gGASP. In the case of SGASP
and GASP n and n′ are indistinguishable, while in gGASP n and n′ can still have different links to other
agents. For a subset N ′ ⊆ N , we denote by T (N ′) the set of agent types occurring in N ′. Note that this
notation requires that the instance is clear from the context. If this is not the case then we denote by T (I)
the set T (N) if N is the set of agents for the instance I of SGASP, GASP, or gGASP.
For every agent type t ∈ T (I), we denote by Nt the subset of N containing all agents of type t; observe
that {Nt | t ∈ T (I) } forms a partition of N . For an agent type t ∈ T (I) we denote by Pt (SGASP) or
t (GASP) the preference list assigned to all agents of type t and we use Pt(a) (for an activity a ∈ A) to
denote Pt restricted to activity a, i.e., Pt(a) is equal to Pn(a) for any agent n of type t. For an assignment
π : N → A∗, t ∈ T (I), and a ∈ A we denote by πt,a the set {n | n ∈ Nt ∧ π(n) = a } and by πt the
set
⋃
a∈A πt,a. Further, π(t) is the set of all activities that have at least one agent of type t participating in
it. We say that π is a perfect assignment for some agent type t ∈ T (I) if π(n) 6= a∅ for every n ∈ Nt. We
denote by PE(I, π) the subset of T (I) consisting of all agent types that are perfectly assigned by π, and say
that π is a perfect assignment if PE(I, π) = T (I).
One notion that will appear throughout the paper is that of compatibility: for a subset Q ⊆ T (I), we
say that π is compatible with Q if PE(I, π) = Q. We conclude this section with a technical lemma which
provides a preprocessing procedure that will be used as a basic tool for obtaining our algorithmic results. In
particular, Lemma 1 allows us to reduce the problem of computing a stable assignment for a SGASP instance
compatible with Q to the problem of finding an individually rational assignment.
Lemma 1. Let I = (N,A, (Pn)n∈N ) be an instance of SGASP and Q ⊆ T (I). Then in time O(|N |
2|A|)
one can compute an instance γ(I,Q) = (N,A, (P ′n)n∈N ) and A6=∅(I,Q) ⊆ A with the following property:
for every assignment π : N → A∗ that is compatible withQ, it holds that π is stable for I if and only if π is
individually rational for γ(I,Q) and π−1(a) 6= ∅ for every a ∈ A6=∅(I,Q).
Proof. Let π : N → A∗ be an assignment that is compatible with Q. Then there is an agent of type t ∈
T (N) assigned to a∅ if and only if t /∈ Q. Hence π is stable for I if and only if π is individually rational and
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additionally it holds that for every agent type t ∈ T (N)\Q and every activity a ∈ A, |π−1(a)|+1 /∈ Pt(a).
This naturally leads us to a certain set of “forbidden” sizes for activities, and we will obtain the desired
instance γ(I,Q) by simply removing all tuples from all preference lists that would allow activities to reach
a forbidden size. Formally, we obtain the desired instance γ(I,Q) from I removing all tuples (a, n) from
every preference list Pt, where t ∈ T (N) such that there is an agent type t
′ ∈ T (N)\Q with n+1 ∈ Pt′(a).
This construction prevents the occurrence of all forbidden sizes of activities except for forbidding activities
of size 0; that is where we use the set A6=∅(I,Q). Formally, the set A6=∅(I,Q) consists of all activities a
such that there is an agent type t ∈ T (N)\Qwith 1 ∈ Pt(a). It is now straightforward to verify that γ(I,Q)
and A6=∅(I,Q) satisfy the claim of the lemma.
Finally the running time ofO(|N |2|A|) for the algorithm can be achieved as follows. In a preprocessing
step we first compute for every activity a ∈ A the set of all forbidden numbers, i.e., the set of all numbers
n such that there is an agent type t ∈ T (N) \ Q with (a, n + 1) ∈ Pt′(a). For every activity a, we store
the resulting set of numbers in such a way that determining whether a number n is contained in the set for
activity a can be achieved in constant time; this can for instance be achieved by storing the set for each
activity a as a Boolean array with |N | entries, whose i-th entry is TRUE if and only if i is contained in the
set of numbers for a. This preprocessing step takes time at most O(|N |2|A|) and after it is completed we
can use the computed sets to test for every agent type t ∈ T (N), every activity a ∈ A, and every n ∈ Pt(a),
whether there is an agent type t′ ∈ T (N)\Q such that (a, n+1) ∈ Pt′(a) in constant time. If so we remove
n from Pt(a), otherwise we continue. This shows that γ(I,Q) can be computed in O(|N |
2 · |A|) time. The
computation of A6=∅ only requires to check for every activity a ∈ A whether 1 is contained in the set of
forbidden numbers for a; if so a is contained in A6=∅ and otherwise it is not. After preprocessing, this can
be achieved in time O(|A|).
3 Subset Sum Machinery
In this section we introduce the subset sum machinery required for our algorithms and lower bound results.
In particular, we introduce three variants of SUBSET SUM, obtain algorithms for two of them, and provide
a W[1]-hardness result for the third. We note that it may be helpful to read the following three subsections
in the context of the individual sections where they are used: in particular, Subsection 3.1 is used to obtain
Result 1 (Section 4), Subsection 3.2 is used as a preprocedure for Result 3 (Section 6) and Subsection 3.3
(which is by far the most difficult of the three) is a crucial step in the reduction used for Result 2 (Section 5).
3.1 Tree Subset Sum
Here we introduce a useful generalization of SUBSET SUM, for which we obtain polynomial-time tractability
under the assumption that the input is encoded in unary. Intuitively, our problem asks us to assign values to
edges while meeting a simple criterion on the values of edges incident to each vertex.
TREE SUBSET SUM (TSS)
Input: A vertex-labeled undirected tree T with labeling function λ : V (T )→ 2N.
Question: Is there an assignment α : E(T )→ N such that for every v ∈ V (T ) it holds
that
∑
e∈E(T )∧v∈e α(e) ∈ λ(v).
Let us briefly comment on the relationship of TSS with SUBSET SUM. Recall that given a set S of
natural numbers and a natural number t, the SUBSET SUM problem asks whether there is a subset S′ of S
such that
∑
s∈S′ s = t. One can easily construct a simple instance (G,λ) of TSS that is equivalent to a
given instance (S, t) of SUBSET SUM as follows. G consists of a star having one leaf ls for every s ∈ S with
λ(ls) = {0, s} and λ(c) = {t} for the center vertex c of the star. Given this simple reduction from SUBSET
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SUM to TSS it becomes clear that TSS is much more general than SUBSET SUM. In particular, instead of
a star TSS allows for the use of an arbitrary tree structure and moreover one can use arbitrary subsets of
natural numbers to specify the constrains on the vertices. The above reduction in combination with the fact
that SUBSET SUM is weakly NP-hard implies that TSS is also weakly NP-hard.
In the remainder of this section we will show that TSS (like SUBSET SUM) can be solved in polynomial-
time if the input is given in unary.
Let I = (T, λ) be an instance of TSS. We denote by max(I) the value of the maximum number
occurring in any vertex label. The main idea behind our algorithm for TSS is to apply leaf-to-root dynamic
programming. In order to execute our dynamic programming procedure, we will need to solve a special case
of TSS which we call PARTITIONED SUBSET SUM; this is the problem that will later arise when computing
the dynamic programming tables for TSS.
PARTITIONED SUBSET SUM
Input: A target set R of natural numbers and ℓ source sets S1, . . . Sℓ of natural
numbers.
Question: Compute the set S of all natural numbers s such that there are s1, . . . , sℓ,
where si ∈ Si for every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, satisfying (
∑
1≤i≤ℓ si) + s ∈ R.
For an instance I = (R,S1, . . . , Sℓ) of PARTITIONED SUBSET SUM, we denote bymax(I) the value of the
maximum number occurring in R.
Lemma 2. An instance I = (R,S1, . . . , Sℓ) of PARTITIONED SUBSET SUM can be solved in time O(ℓ ·
max(I)2).
Proof. Here we also use a dynamic programming approach similar to the approach used for the well-known
SUBSET SUM problem [14]. Let I = (R,S1, . . . , Sℓ) be an instance of PARTITIONED SUBSET SUM.
We first apply a minor modification to the instance which will allow us to provide a cleaner presentation
of the algorithm. Namely, let P0, P1, . . . , Pℓ be sets of integers defined as follows: P0 = R, and for every
i ∈ [ℓ], we set Pi = {−s | s ∈ Si }. Then the solution S for I is exactly the set of all natural numbers n for
which there are p0, . . . , pℓ with pi ∈ Pi for every i with 0 ≤ i ≤ ℓ such that
∑
0≤i≤ℓ pi = n.
In order to compute the solution S for I (employing the above characterization for S), we compute a
table D having one binary entry D[i, n] for every i and n with 0 ≤ i ≤ ℓ and 0 ≤ n ≤ max(I) such that
D[i, n] = 1 if and only if there are p0, . . . , pi with
∑
0≤j≤i pj = n. Note that the solution S for I can be
obtained from the table D as the set of all numbers n such that D[ℓ, n] = 1. It hence remains to show how
D can be computed.
We compute D[i, n] via dynamic programming using the following recurrence relation. We start by
setting D[0, n] = 1 for every n with 0 ≤ n ≤ max(I) if and only if n ∈ P0. Moreover, for every i with
1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ and every n with 0 ≤ n ≤ max(I), we set D[i, n] = 1 if and only if there is an n′ with
n ≤ n′ ≤ max(I) and a p ∈ Pi such that n
′ + p = n and D[i− 1, n′] = 1.
The running time of the algorithm is O(ℓ · max(I)2) since we require O(ℓ · max(I)) to initialize the
table D and each of the ℓ recursive steps requires time O(max(I)2).
With Lemma 2 in hand, we can proceed to a polynomial-time algorithm for TSS.
Lemma 3. An instance I = (T, λ) of TSS can be solved in time O(|V (T )|2 ·max(I)2).
Proof. As mentioned earlier, the main idea behind our algorithm for TSS is to use a dynamic programming
algorithm working from the leaves to an arbitrarily chosen root r of the tree T . Informally, the algorithm
computes a set of numbers for each non-root vertex v of T representing the set of all assignments of the
edge from v to its parent that can be extended to a valid assignment of all edges in the subtree of T rooted
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at v. Once this set has been computed for all children of the root we can construct a simple PARTITIONED
SUBSET SUM instance (given below) to decide whether I has a solution.
More formally, for a vertex v of T we denote by Tv the subtree of T rooted at v and by T
∗
v the subtree of
T consisting of Tv plus the edge between v and its parent in T ; for the root r of T it holds that T
∗
v = Tv. For
every non-root vertex v with parent p we will compute a set R(v) of numbers. Informally, R(v) contains
all numbers n such that the assignment setting {p, v} to n can be extended to an assignment for all the
edges in T ∗v satisfying all constrains given by the vertices in Tv. More formally, n ∈ R(v) if and only if
there is an assignment α : E(T ∗v ) → N with α({p, v}) = n such that for every v ∈ V (Tv) it holds that∑
e∈E(T ∗v )∧v∈e
α(e) =
∑
e∈E(T )∧v∈e α(e) ∈ λ(v).
As stated above we will compute the setsR(v) via a bottom-up dynamic programming algorithm starting
at the leaves of T and computing R(v) for every inner node v of T using solely the computed sets R(c) of
each child c of v in T . Note that having computed R(c) for every child c of the root r of T we can decide
whether I has a solution as follows. Let c1, . . . , cℓ be the children of r in T ; then I has a solution if and only
if the solution set for the instance (λ(r), R(c1), . . . , R(cℓ)) of PARTITIONED SUBSET SUM contains 0.
It remains to show how to compute R(v) for the leaves and inner nodes of T . If v is a leaf then R(v)
is simply equal to λ(v). Moreover, if v is an inner node with children c1, . . . , cℓ, then R(v) is equal to the
solution set for the instance (λ(v), R(c1), . . . , R(cℓ)) of PARTITIONED SUBSET SUM. This completes the
description of the algorithm.
The running time of the algorithm is at most O(|V (T )|2 · max(I)2) since the time required at a leaf q
of T is at most O(max(λ(q))) and the time required at any none-leaf node t of T with children t1, . . . , tℓ
is at most the time required to solve the instance (λ(t), R(t1), . . . , R(tℓ)) of PARTITIONED SUBSET SUM,
which is at most O(|V (T )| ·max(λ(v))2) due to Lemma 2.
3.2 Multidimensional Partitioned Subset Sum
Our second generalization of SUBSET SUM is a multi-dimensional variant of the problem that allows to
separate the input set of numbers into several groups, and restricts the solution to take at most 1 vector from
each group. For technical reasons, we will only search for solutions of size at most r.
MULTIDIMENSIONAL PARTITIONED SUBSET SUM (MPSS)
Input: k ∈ N, r ∈ N0, and a family P = {P1, . . . Pl} of sets of vectors over N
k
0.
Question: Compute the set of all vectors t¯ ∈ {0, . . . , r}k such that there are p¯1, . . . , p¯l
with p¯i ∈ Pi for every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ l such that
∑
1≤i≤l p¯i = t¯.
It is easy to see that SUBSET SUM is a special case of MPSS: given an instance of SUBSET SUM, we
can create an equivalent instance of MPSS by setting r to a sufficiently large number and simply making
each group Pi contain two vectors: the all-zero vector and the vector that is equal to the i-th number of the
SUBSET SUM instance in all entries.
Lemma 4. An instance I = (k, r,P) of MPSS can be solved in time O(|P| · rk).
Proof. We use a dynamic programming procedure similar to the approach used for the well-known SUBSET
SUM problem [14]. Let I = (k, r,P) with P = {P1, . . . , Pl} be an instance of MPSS.
We solve I by computing a table D having one binary entry D[i, t¯] for every i and t¯ with 0 ≤ i ≤ l and
t¯ ∈ [r]k0 such thatD[i, t¯] = 1 if and only if there are p¯1, . . . , p¯i with p¯j ∈ Pj for every j with 1 ≤ j ≤ i such
that
∑
1≤j≤i p¯j = t¯. Note that the solution for I can be obtained from the table D as the set of all vectors
t¯ ∈ [r]k0 such that D[l, t¯] = 1. It hence remains to show how to compute the table D.
We compute D[i, t¯] via dynamic programming using the following recurrence relation. We start by
setting D[1, t¯] = 1 for every t¯ ∈ [r]k0 if and only if t¯ ∈ P1. Moreover, for every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ l and every
t¯ ∈ [r]k0 , we set D[i, t¯] = 1 if and only if there is a p¯j ∈ Pj with p¯j ≤ t¯ such that D[i− 1, t¯− p¯j] = 1.
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The running time of the algorithm is O(|P| · rk) since we require O(|P| · rk) to initialize the table D
and each of the |P| recursive steps requires time O(rk).
3.3 Simple Multidimensional Partitioned Subset Sum
In this section, we are interested in a much more restrictive version of MPSS, where all vectors (apart from
the target vector) are only allowed to have at most one non-zero component. Surprisingly, we show that the
W[1]-hardness of the previously studied MULTIDIMENSIONAL SUBSET SUM problem [13, 12] carries over
to this more restrictive variant using an intricate and involved reduction.
To formalize, we say that a set P of vectors in Nd0 is simple if each vector in P has exactly one non-zero
component and the values of the non-zero components for any two distinct vectors in P are distinct.
SIMPLE MULTIDIMENSIONAL PARTITIONED SUBSET SUM (SMPSS)
Input: d ∈ N, t¯ ∈ Nd0, and a family P = {P1, . . . Pl} of simple sets of vectors in N
d
0.
Parameter: d.
Question: Are there vectors p¯1, . . . , p¯l with p¯i ∈ Pi for every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ l such that∑
1≤i≤l p¯i = t¯.
Theorem 5. SMPSS is strongly W[1]-hard.
Proof. We will employ a parameterized reduction from the PARTITIONED CLIQUE problem, which is well-
known to be W[1]-complete [21].
PARTITIONED CLIQUE
Input: An integer k, a k-partite graph G = (V,E) with partition {V1, . . . , Vk} of V into
sets of equal size.
Parameter: k
Question: Does G have a k-clique, i.e., a set C ⊆ V of k vertices such that ∀u, v ∈ C , with
u 6= v there is an edge {u, v} ∈ E?
We denote by Ei,j the set of edges of G that have one endpoint in Vi and one endpoint in Vj and we
assume w.l.o.g. that |Vi = {v
i
1, . . . , v
i
n}| = n and |Ei,j| = m for every i and j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k (see the
standard parameterized complexity textbook for a justification of these assumptions [2]).
Given an instance (G, k) of PARTITIONED CLIQUE with partition V1, . . . , Vk, we construct an equivalent
instance I = (d, t¯,P) of SMPSS in polynomial time, where d = k(k−1)+
(
k
2
)
and |P| =
(
k
2
)
+nk(2k−3).
We will also make use of the following notation. For i and j with 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j < k, we denote
by indJ(i, j) the j-th smallest number in [k] \ {i} and we denote by indMin(i) and indMax(i) the numbers
indJ(i, 1) and indJ(i, k − 1), respectively.
We assign to every vertex v ofG a unique number S(v) from a Sidon sequence S of length |V (G)| [10].
A Sidon sequence is a sequence of natural numbers such that the sum of each pair of numbers is unique;
it can be shown that it is possible to construct such sequences whose maximum value is bounded by a
polynomial in its length [1, 10].
To simplify the description of I , we will introduce names and notions to identify both components of
vectors and sets in P. Every vector in I has the following components:
• For every i and j with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k and i 6= j, the vertex component ciV (j). We set t¯[c
i
V (j)] to:
– n6 + n4 if j = indMin(i),
– (n− 1)n8 + n6 + n4 +
∑n
ℓ=1(ℓ+ ℓn
2) if j > indMin(i) and j < indMax(i), and
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– (n− 1)n8 + n6 +
∑n
ℓ=1(ℓ), otherwise.
• For every i and j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, the edge component cE(i, j) with t¯[cE(i, j)] =
∑
v∈Vi∪Vj
S(v).
Note that the total number of components d is equal to k(k − 1) +
(
k
2
)
and that for every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
there are k − 1 vertex components, i.e., the components ciV (indJ(i, 1)), . . . , c
i
V (indJ(i, k − 1)), which
intuitively have the following tasks. The first component, i.e., the component ciV (indJ(i, 1)) identifies a
vertex v ∈ Vi that should be part of a k-clique in G. Moreover, every component c
i
V (indJ(i, j)) (including
the first component), is also responsible for: (1) Signalling the choice of the chosen vertex v ∈ Vi to the
next component, i.e., the component ciV (indJ(i, j +1)) and (2) Signalling the choice of the vertex v ∈ Vi to
the component cE(i, j) that will then verify that there is an edge between the vertex chosen for Vi and the
vertex chosen for Vj . This interplay between the components will be achieved through the sets of vectors in
P that will be defined and explained next.
P 1EV (2, ℓ) P
1
V (2, ℓ) P
1
EV (3, ℓ) P
1
V (3, ℓ) P
1
EV (4, ℓ) t¯
c1V (2) n
6 + ℓ n4 − ℓ n6 + n4
c1V (3) n
8 + ℓ+ ℓn2 n6 + ℓ n4 + ℓn2 Z + n4 +
∑n
ℓ=1(ℓn
2)
c1V (4) n
8 + ℓ n6 + ℓ Z
cE(1, 2) S(v
1
ℓ )
∑
v∈V1∪V2
S(v)
cE(1, 3) S(v
1
ℓ )
∑
v∈V1∪V3
S(v)
cE(1, 4) S(v
1
ℓ )
∑
v∈V1∪V4
S(v)
Table 2: An illustration of the vectors contained in the sets P 1EV (2, ℓ), . . . , P
1
EV (4, ℓ) and P
1
V (2, ℓ), . . . , P
1
V (3, ℓ). For
example the column for the set P 1EV (2, ℓ) shows that the set contains two vectors, one whose only non-zero component
c1V (2) has the value n
6 + ℓ and a second one whose only non-zero component cE(1, 2) and has the value S(v1ℓ ). The
last column provides the value for the target vector for the component given by the row. Finally, the value Z is equal
to (n− 1)n8 + n6 +
∑n
l=1(ℓ).
P iEV (j, ℓ) P
j
EV (i, ℓ) PE(i, j) t¯
ciV (j) n
6 + ℓ
cjV (i) n
6 + ℓ
cE(i, j) S(v
i
ℓ) S(v
j
ℓ ) {S(v) + S(u) | {v, u} ∈ Ei,j }
∑
v∈Vi∪Vj
S(v)
Table 3: An illustration of the vectors contained in the sets P iEV (j, ℓ), P
j
EV (i, ℓ), and PE(i, j) and their interplay with
the components ciV (j), c
j
V (i), and cV (i, j). For the conventions used in the table please refer to Table 2. Additionally,
note that the column for PE(i, j) indicates that the set contains one vector for every edge {v, u} ∈ Ei,j , whose only
non-zero component cE(i, j) has the value S(v) + S(u).
P consists of the following sets, which are illustrated in Table 2 and 3:
• For every i, j′, and ℓ with 1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j′ ≤ k − 2, and 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n, the vertex set P iV (j, ℓ), where
j = indJ(i, j′), containing two vectors v¯+i,j,ℓ and v¯
−
i,j,ℓ defined as follows:
– if j′ = 1, then v¯+i,j,ℓ[c
i
V (j)] = n
4 − ℓ and v¯−i,j,ℓ[c
i
V (indJ(i, j
′ + 1))] = n8 + ℓ+ ℓn2 or
– if 1 < j′ < k − 2, then v¯+i,j,ℓ[c
i
V (j)] = n
4 + ℓn2 and v¯−i,j,ℓ[c
i
V (indJ(i, j
′ + 1))] = n8 + ℓ+ ℓn2
or
– if j′ = k − 2, then v¯+i,j,ℓ[c
i
V (j)] = n
4 + ℓn2 and v¯−i,j,ℓ[c
i
V (indJ(i, j
′ + 1))] = n8 + ℓ.
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We denote by P iV (j), P
i
V+(j), and P
i
V−(j) the sets
⋃n
ℓ=1(P
i
V (j, ℓ)), P
i
V (j) ∩ { v¯
+
i,j,ℓ | 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n },
and P iV (j) \ P
i
V+(j), respectively.
• For every i, j, and ℓwith 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k, i 6= j, and 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n, the vertex incidence set P iEV (j, ℓ), which
contains the two vectors a¯+i,j,ℓ and a¯
−
i,j,ℓ such that a¯
+
i,j,ℓ[c
i
V (j)] = n
6 + ℓ and a¯−i,j,ℓ[cE(i, j)] = S(v
i
ℓ).
We denote by P iEV (j), P
i
EV+(j), and P
i
EV−(j) the sets
⋃n
ℓ=1(P
i
EV (j, ℓ)), P
i
V (j) ∩ { a¯
+
i,j,ℓ | 1 ≤ ℓ ≤
n }, and P iEV (j) \ P
i
EV+(j), respectively.
• For every i, j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, the edge set PE(i, j), which for every e = {v, u} ∈ Ei,j contains
the vector e¯ such that e¯[cE(i, j)] = S(v) + S(u); note that PE(i, j) is indeed a simple set, because S
is a Sidon sequence.
Note that altogether there are nk(k − 2) +
(
k
2
)
+ nk(k − 1) =
(
k
2
)
+ nk(2k − 3) sets in P.
Informally, the two vectors v¯+i,j,ℓ and v¯
−
i,j,ℓ in P
i
V (j, ℓ) represent the choice of whether or not the vertex
viℓ should be included in a k-clique for G, i.e., if a solution for I chooses v
+
i,j,ℓ then v
i
ℓ should be part of a
k-clique and otherwise not. The component ciV (j), more specifically the value for t¯[c
i
V (j)], now ensures that
a solution can choose at most one such vector in P iV+(j). Moreover, the fact that all but one of the vectors
v¯−i,j,1, . . . , v¯
−
i,j,n need to be chosen by a solution for I signals the choice of the vertex for Vi to the next
component, i.e., either the component ciV (j +1) if j+1 6= i or the component c
i
V (j +2) if j+1 = i. Note
that we only need k−2 sets P iV (j) for every i, because we need to copy the vertex choice for Vi to only k−1
components. A similar idea underlies the two vectors a¯+i,j,ℓ and a¯
−
i,j,ℓ in P
i
EV (j, ℓ), i.e., again the component
ciV (j) ensures that a¯
+
i,j,ℓ can be chosen for only one of the sets P
i
EV (j, 1), . . . , P
i
EV (j, n) and a¯
−
i,j,ℓ must be
chosen for all the remaining ones. Note that the component ciV (j) now also ensures that the choice made for
the sets in P iV (j) is the same as the choice made for the sets in P
i
EV (j). Moreover, the choice made for the
sets in P iEV (j) is now propagated to the component cE(i, j) (instead of the next vertex component). Finally,
the vectors in the set PE(i, j) represent the choice of the edge used in a k-clique between Vi and Vj and the
component cE(i, j) ensures that only an edge, whose endpoints are the two vertices signalled by the sets
P iEV (j) and P
j
EV (i) can be chosen. We are now ready to give a formal proof for the equivalence between
the two instances.
This completes the construction of I . It is straightforward to verify that all sets in P are simple, I can
be constructed in polynomial-time, and all the component values of all vectors are bounded by a polynomial
in n. It hence only remains to show that (G, k) has a solution if and only if so does I .
Towards showing the forward direction, let c1, . . . , ck with ci ∈ Vi be the vertices of a k-clique of G
and for every i and j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, let ei,j be the edge between ci and cj in G. We obtain a solution
S ⊆ P for I with
∑
s¯∈S s¯ = t¯ and |S ∩ P | = 1 for every P ∈ P by choosing the following vectors:
• For every i and j with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k and j 6= i, we choose the vector a¯+i,j,ℓ from the set P
i
EV (j, ℓ) if
viℓ = ci and otherwise we choose the vector a¯
−
i,j,ℓ.
• For every i and j with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k and j /∈ {i, indMax(i)}, we choose the vector v¯+i,j,ℓ from the set
P iV (j, ℓ) if v
i
ℓ = ci and otherwise we choose the vector v¯
−
i,j,ℓ.
• For every i and j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, we choose the vector ¯ei,j from the set PE(i, j).
It is straightforward to verify that the above choices constitute a solution for I .
Towards showing the reverse direction, let S ⊆
⋃
P∈P P be a solution for I , i.e.,
∑
s¯∈S s¯ = t¯ and
|S ∩ P | = 1 for every P ∈ P. We show the reverse direction using the following series of claims.
(C1) For every i and j with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k and i 6= j, it holds that |S ∩P iEV+(j)| = 1 and |S ∩P
i
EV−(j)| =
n− 1. In the following let v¯iEV (j) be the unique vector in S ∩ P
i
EV+(j).
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(C2) For every i and j′ with 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j′ ≤ k − 2, it holds that |S ∩ P iV+(j)| = 1 and
|S ∩ P iV−(j)| = n − 1, where j = indJ(i, j
′). In the following let v¯iV (j) be the unique vector in
S ∩ P iV+(j).
(C3) For every i, j and j′ with 1 ≤ i, j, j′ ≤ k, j 6= i, j′ 6= i, and j′ 6= j, it holds that v¯iEV (j)[c
i
V (j)] =
v¯iEV (j
′)[ciV (j
′)]. In other words for i as above, there exists a unique value ℓi such that v¯
i
EV (j)[c
i
V (j)] =
n6 + ℓi for every j as above.
(C4) For every i and j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, G contains an edge between viℓi and v
j
ℓj
.
(C5) The vertices v1ℓ1 , . . . , v
k
ℓk
induce a clique in G.
Towards showing (C1) consider the component ciV (j). Then t¯[c
i
v(j)] contains the term n
6 and moreover
the only vectors of I having a non-zero component at ciV (j) (apart from the vectors in P
i
EV+(j)) are the
vectors in P iV−(j
′) (only if j > indMin(i)), where j′ = j− 1 if j− 1 6= i and j′ = j− 2 otherwise, and the
vectors in P iV+(j
′) (only if j < indMax(i)). The former all have values larger than n8 ≥ n6 and the sum
of all values of the latter is at most
∑n
ℓ=1 n
4 + ℓn2 ≤ 2n5 < n6. Hence the only vectors that can contribute
the term n6 are the vectors in P iEV+(j) and since n
6 appears exactly once in t¯[ciV (j)], (C1) follows.
Towards showing (C2) consider the component ciV (j). Then t¯[c
i
V (j)] contains the term n
4 and moreover
the only vectors of I having a non-zero component at ciV (j) (apart from the vectors in P
i
E+(j)) are the
vectors in P iV−(j
′) (only if j > indMin(i)), where j′ = j− 1 if j− 1 6= i and j′ = j− 2 otherwise, and the
vectors in P iEV−(j). The former and the latter have values larger than n
8 and n6, respectively. Hence the
only vectors that can contribute the term n4 are the vectors in P iV+(j) and since n
4 appears exactly once in
t¯[ciV (j)], (C2) follows.
Towards showing (C3), we show that v¯iEV (j)[c
i
V (j)] = v¯
i
EV (j
′)[ciV (j
′)], where j = indJ(i, r) and
j′ = indJ(i, r + 1) for every r with 1 ≤ r < k. Since we can assume that w.l.o.g. k > 3, we only need to
distinguish the following three cases:
(A) r = 1 and r + 1 < k − 1,
(B) r > 1 and r + 1 < k − 1,
(C) r > 1 and r + 1 = k − 1.
For the case (A), consider the component ciV (j). Note that due to (C1) and (C2), the vectors v¯
i
EV (j) and
v¯iV (j) are the only vectors in S, for which the component c
i
V (j) is non-zero. Hence, v¯
i
EV (j)[c
i
V (j)] +
v¯iV (j)[c
i
V (j)] = t¯[c
i
V (j)] = n
6 + n4, which is only possible if v¯iEV (j) = a¯
+
i,j,ℓ1
and v¯iV (j) = v¯
+
i,j,ℓ1
for some ℓ1 with 1 ≤ ℓ1 ≤ n. Now consider the component c
i
V (j
′). Because of (C2), we obtain that∑
s∈S∩P i
V−(j)
s[ciV (j)] = (
∑n
ℓ=1 n
8 + ℓ+ ℓn2) − (n8 + ℓ1 + ℓ1n
2). Moreover, because of (C1) and (C2),
we obtain that (
∑n
ℓ=1 n
8 + ℓ + ℓn2) − (n8 + ℓ1 + ℓ1n
2) + v¯iEV (j
′) + v¯iV (j
′) = t¯[ciV (j
′), which is only
possible if v¯iEV (j
′) = a¯+i,j′,ℓ1 and v¯
i
V (j
′) = v¯+i,j′,ℓ1 . Hence v¯
i
EV (j)[c
i
V (j)] = v¯
i
EV (j
′)[ciV (j
′)], as required.
The proof for the cases (B) and (C) is analogous.
Towards showing (C4) consider the component cE(i, j). Note that the set P
i
EV (j), P
j
EV (i), and PE(i, j)
are the only sets in P containing vectors that are non-zero at cE(i, j). Moreover, because of (C1) it
holds that
∑
s¯∈S∩P i
EV
(j) s¯[cE(i, j)] = (
∑n
ℓ=1 S(v
i
ℓ)) − S(v
i
ℓi
) and similarly
∑
s¯∈S∩P j
EV
(i)
s¯[cE(i, j)] =
(
∑n
ℓ=1 S(v
j
ℓ )) − S(v
j
ℓj
). Since t¯[cE(i, j)] =
∑
v∈Vi∪Vj
S(v), we obtain that the unique vector e¯ ∈ S ∩
PE(i, j) must satisfy e¯[cE(i, j)] = S(v
i
ℓi
) + S(vjℓj ), which due the properties of Sidon sequences is only
possible if e is an edge between viℓi and v
j
ℓj
inG. Finally, (C5) follows immediately from (C3) and (C4).
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4 Result 1: Fixed-Parameter Tractability of SGASP
In this section we will establish that SGASP is FPT when parameterized by the number of agent types and
the number of activities by proving Theorem 6.
Theorem 6. SGASP can be solved in time O(2|T (N)|·(1+|A|) · ((|N | + |A|)|N |)2).
Let I = (N,A, (Pn)n∈N ) be a SGASP instance and let π : N → A∗ be an assignment of agents to
activities. We denote by GI(π) the incidence graph between T (N) and A, which is defined as follows.
GI(π) has vertices T (N) ∪A and contains an edge between an agent type t ∈ T (N) and an activity a ∈ A
if πt,a 6= ∅. We say that π is acyclic if GI(π) is acyclic.
Our first aim towards the proof of Theorem 6 is to show that if I has a stable assignment, then it also has
an acyclic stable assignment (Lemma 9). We will then show in Lemma 11 that finding a stable assignment
whose incidence graph is equal to some given acyclic pattern graph can be achieved in polynomial-time via
a reduction to the TSS problem defined and solved in Subsection 3.1. Since the number of (acyclic) pattern
graphs is bounded in our parameters, we can subsequently solve SGASP by enumerating all acyclic pattern
graphs and checking for each of them whether there is an acyclic solution matching the selected pattern.
A crucial notion towards showing that it is sufficient to consider only acyclic solutions is the notion
of (strict) compression. We say that an assignment τ is a compression of π if it satisfies the following
conditions:
(C1) for every t ∈ T (N) it holds that |πt| = |τt|,
(C2) for every a ∈ A it holds that |π−1(a)| = |τ−1(a)|, and
(C3) for every a ∈ A it holds that the set of agent types τ assigns to a is a subset of the agent types π
assigns to a.
Moreover, if τ additionally satisfies:
(C4) |E(GI (τ))| < |E(GI (π))|,
we say that τ is a strict compression of π.
Intuitively, an assignment τ is a compression of π if it maintains all the properties required to preserve
stability and compatibility with a given subset Q ⊆ T (N). We note that condition (C3) can be formalized as
T (τ−1(a)) ⊆ T (π−1(a)). Observe that if τ is a strict compression then there is at least one activity a ∈ A
such that T (τ−1(a)) ⊂ T (π−1(a)). The following lemma shows that every assignment that is not acyclic
admits a strict compression.
Lemma 7. If π is not acyclic, then there exists an assignment τ that strictly compresses π.
Proof. Let C = (t1, a1, . . . , tl, al, t1) be a cycle of GI(π). Consider the following modification (M) of our
instance: reassign one (arbitrary) agent in πt1,a1 to al, and for every i with 1 < i ≤ l reassign one (arbitrary)
agent in πti,ai to ai−1. An illustration of (M) is also provided in Figure 1.
First, we show that the assignment κ obtained from π after applying modification (M) satisfies (C1)–
(C3). Towards showing (C1), observe that |πt| = |κt| for any t ∈ T (N) \ {t1, . . . , tl}. Moreover, for every
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t1
t2
t3
a1
a2
a3
−1
+1
−1
+1
−1
+1
Figure 1: Illustration of the modification (M) in the proof of Lemma 7 for a cycle of length six. A label of +1 on an
edge {t, a} ofGI(π) means that |κt,a| is by one larger than |πt,a|. Similarly, a label of −1 on an edge {t, a} ofGI(π)
means that |κt,a| is by one smaller than |πt,a|.
i with 1 < i ≤ l, we have:
|κti | =
∑
a∈A
|κti,a|
=
( ∑
a∈(A\{ai,ai−1})
|κti,a|) + |κti,ai |+ |κti,ai−1 |
)
=
( ∑
a∈(A\{ai,ai−1})
|πti,a|) + (|πti,ai | − 1) + (|πti,ai−1 |+ 1
)
=
∑
a∈A
|πti,a|
= |πti |
and for i = 1 we have:
|κt1 | =
∑
a∈A
|κt1,a|
=
( ∑
a∈(A\{a1,al})
|κti,a)|+ |κt1,a1 |+ |κt1,al |
)
=
( ∑
a∈(A\{a1,al})
|πt1,a|
)
+ (|πt1,a1 | − 1) + (|πt1,al |+ 1)
=
∑
a∈A
|πt1,a|
= |πt1 |
Towards showing (C2) note that |π−1(a)| = |κ−1(a)| for every a ∈ A\{a1, . . . , al} and moreover for every
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i with 1 ≤ i < l we obtain:
|κ−1(ai)| =
∑
t∈T (N)
|κt,ai |
=
( ∑
t∈(T (N)\{ti ,ti+1})
|κt,ai)|+ |κti,ai |+ |κti+1,ai |
= (
∑
t∈(T (N)\{ti ,ti+1})
|πt,ai)|+ (|πti,ai | − 1) + (|πti+1,ai |+ 1)
=
∑
t∈T (N)
|πt,ai |
= |π−1(ai)|
and for i = l we have:
|κ−1(al)| =
∑
t∈T (N)
|κt,al |
= (
∑
t∈(T (N)\{tl ,t1})
|κt,al)|+ |κtl ,al |+ |κt1,al |
= (
∑
t∈(T (N)\{tl ,t1})
|πt,al)|+ (|πtl,al | − 1) + (|πt1,al |+ 1)
=
∑
t∈T (N)
|πt,al |
= |π−1(al)|
Because |κt,a| and |πt,a| can only differ if |πt,a| 6= 0, i.e., |κt,a| will never be non-equal to zero if
|πt,a| = 0, we obtain that |κ| satisfies also condition (C3).
Having settled that (M) does not violate (C1)–(C3), we observe that if GI(κ) still contains the cycle C ,
we can apply modification (M) again to κ and the obtained assignment still satisfies conditions (C1)–(C3).
Hence we can repeatedly apply modification (M) as long as the cycle C is not destroyed in the resulting
assignment. Namely let m = min{πt1,a1 , . . . , πtl,al}, let i be an index with m = πti,ai , and let τ be the
assignment obtained afterm applications of modification (M) to π. Note thatm applications of modification
(M) are possible since the cycle C remains preserved up to them− 1-th modification of (M). Furthermore,
since |τti,ai | = 0, we obtain that τ satisfies (C4).
The following lemma shows that any assignment can be compressed into an acyclic assignment.
Lemma 8. Let π : N → A∗ be an assignment for I . Then there exists an acyclic assignment π′ that
compresses π.
Proof. The lemma follows via an exhaustive application of Lemma 7. Namely, we start by checking whether
π is acyclic. If yes, then π itself is the acyclic assignment that compresses π. If not, then we apply Lemma 7
to π and obtain the assignment π′ that strictly compresses π. If π′ is acyclic, we are done; otherwise, we
repeat the above procedure with π′ instead of π. Because at every step |E(GI(π))| < |E(GI(π
′))| and
GI(π) has at most |T (N)| · |A| edges, this process concludes after at most |T (N)| · |A| steps and results in
an acyclic assignment that compresses π.
The following lemma provides the first cornerstone for our algorithm by showing that it is sufficient to
consider only acyclic solutions. Intuitively, it is a consequence of Lemma 8 along with the observation that
compression preserves stability and individual rationality.
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Lemma 9. If I has a stable assignment, then I has an acyclic stable assignment.
Proof. Let π be a stable assignment for I . Because of Lemma 8, there is an acyclic assignment π′ that
compresses π. We claim that π′ is also a stable assignment. Conditions (C2) and (C3) together with the
fact that π is individually rational imply that also π′ is individually rational. Moreover, it follows from
Condition (C1) that PE(I, π) = PE(I, π′), which together with Condition (C2) and the stability of π implies
the stability of π′.
Our next step is the introduction of terminology related to the pattern graphs mentioned at the beginning
of this section. LetG be a bipartite graph with bi-partition {T (N), A}. We say thatGmodels an assignment
π : N → A∗ if GI(π) = G; in this sense every such bipartite graph can be seen as a pattern (or model) for
assignments. For a subset Q ⊆ T (N) we say that G is compatible with Q if every vertex in Q and every
vertex in A6=∅(I,Q) (recall the definition of A6=∅(I,Q) given in Lemma 1) has at least one neighbour in G;
note that if G is compatible with Q then any assignment π modelled by G satisfies τ−1(a) 6= ∅ for every
a ∈ A6=∅(I,Q). Intuitively, the graph G captures information about which types of agents are mapped to
which activities (without specifying numbers), while Q captures information about which agent types are
perfectly (i.e., “completely”) assigned.
Let Q ⊆ T (N) and let G be a bipartite graph with bi-partition {T (N), A} that is compatible with Q.
The following simple lemma shows that, modulo compatibility requirements, finding a stable assignment for
I can be reduced to finding an individually rational assignment for γ(I,Q) (recall the definition of γ(I,Q)
given in Lemma 1).
Lemma 10. Let Q ⊆ T (N) and let G be a bipartite graph with bi-partition {T (N), A} that is compatible
with Q. Then for every assignment π : N → A∗ modelled by G and compatible with Q, it holds that π is
stable for I if and only if π is individually rational for γ(I,Q).
Proof. Since π is compatible with Q, it follows from Lemma 1 that π is stable for I if and only if π
is individually rational for γ(I,Q) and τ−1(a) 6= ∅ for every a ∈ A6=∅(I,Q). Consider an arbitrary
a ∈ A6=∅(I,Q). Because G is compatible with Q it holds that every a has at least one neighbour in G and
since π is modelled by G, we obtain that π−1(a) 6= ∅, as required.
The next, final lemma forms (together with Lemma 9) the core component of our proof of Theorem 6.
Lemma 11. Let Q ⊆ T (N) and let G be an acyclic bipartite graph with bi-partition {T (N), A} that is
compatible with Q. Then one can decide in time O((|N | + |A|)2|N |2) whether I has a stable assignment
which is modelled by G and compatible with Q.
Proof. By Lemma 10, I has a stable assignment that is modelled by G and compatible withQ if and only if
γ(I,Q) has an individually rational assignment that is modelled by G and compatible with Q. To determine
whether γ(I,Q) has an individually rational assignment that is compatible with Q and modelled by G, we
will employ a reduction to the TSS problem, which can be solved in polynomial-time by Lemma 3.
The reduction proceeds as follows. We will construct an instance I ′ = (T, λ) of TSS that is a YES-in-
stance if and only if γ(I,Q) = (N,A, (P ′n)n∈N ) has an individually rational assignment that is compatible
with Q and modelled by G. We set T to be the graph G and let λ be defined for every v ∈ V (G) as follows:
• if v ∈ Q, then λ(v) = {|Nv|},
• if v ∈ T (N) \Q, then λ(v) = {0, . . . , |Nv| − 1},
• otherwise, i.e., if v ∈ A, then λ(v) =
⋂
t∈T (N)∧{v,t}∈E(G) P
′
t(v).
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Note that the reduction can be achieved in time O(|E(G)||N |), assuming that the sets Pt(a) for every
t ∈ T (N) and a ∈ A are given in terms of a data structure that allows to test containment in constant
time; such a data structure could for instance be a Boolean array with |N | entries, whose i-th entry is TRUE
if and only if i is contained in Pt(a). Because the time to construct γ(I,Q) and A6=∅(I,Q) is at most
O((|N | · |A|)|N |) (Lemma 1) and the time to solve I ′ is at most O(|V (T )|2 · |N |2) = O(|V (G)|2 · |N |2) =
O
(
(|N |+|A|)2|N |2
)
(Lemma 3), we obtainO
(
(|N |+|A|)2|N |2
)
as the total running time of the algorithm.
It remains to show that I ′ is a YES-instance if and only if I has an individually rational assignment
that is compatible with Q and modelled by G. Towards showing the forward direction let α : E(T ) → N
be a solution for I ′. We claim that the assignment π : N → A∗ that for every edge e = {t, a} of G
assigns exactly α({t, a}) agents of type t to activity a and assigns all remaining agents (if any) to a∅ is an
individually rational assignment for γ(I,Q) that is compatible with Q and modelled by G. First observe
that for every t ∈ T (N) and every a ∈ A it holds that πt,a = α({t, a}) if {t, a} ∈ E(T ) and πt,a = 0
otherwise. Hence GI(π) = G = T which implies that π is modelled by G. We show next that π is also
compatible with Q, i.e., π satisfies:
(P1) for every t ∈ Q, it holds that
∑
a∈A |πt,a| = |Nt|,
(P2) for every t ∈ T (N) \Q, it holds that
∑
a∈A |πt,a| < |Nt|,
Towards showing (P1) first note that because G is compatible with Q, it holds that every t ∈ Q is adjacent
to at least one edge in G and thus also in T . Moreover, because α is a solution for I ′, we obtain that∑
e={t,a}∈E(T ) α(e) =∈ λ(t) = {|Nt|}. Since
∑
e={t,a}∈E(T ) α(e) =
∑
a∈A |πt,a|, we obtain (P1).
Towards showing (P2) let t ∈ T (N) \ Q. If t is isolated in T then
∑
a∈A |πt,a| = 0 but Nt 6= ∅ and
hence
∑
a∈A |πt,a| < |Nt|, as required. If on the other hand t is not isolated in T then because α is a solution
for I ′, we obtain that
∑
e={t,a}∈E(T ) α(e) =∈ λ(t) = {0, . . . , |Nt| − 1}. Since
∑
e={t,a}∈E(T ) α(e) =∑
a∈A |πt,a|, we obtain (P2).
Finally it remains to show that π is individually rational for γ(I,Q), i.e., for every a ∈ A and t ∈ T (N),
it holds that if πt,a 6= ∅ then |π
−1(a)| ∈ P ′t (a). Let a ∈ A. If a has no neighbour in T then πt,a = 0 for
every t ∈ T (N) and the claim holds. Hence let t1, . . . , tl be the neighbours of a in T . Then because α is a
solution for I ′, we obtain:
|π−1(a)| =
∑
1≤i≤l
|πti,a|
=
∑
1≤i≤l
α({ti, a})
∈ λ(a) =
⋂
1≤i≤l
P ′ti(a)
Hence for every 1 ≤ i ≤ l it holds that |π−1(a)| ∈ P ′ti(a), as required.
Towards showing the reverse direction let π be an individually rational assignment for γ(I,Q) that is
compatible with Q and modelled by G. We claim that the assignment α : E(G) → N with α({t, a}) = πt,a
for every {t, a} ∈ E(T ) is a solution for I ′. Observe that because π is modelled by G, we have that
πt,a 6= 0 if and only if {t, a} ∈ E(G). Hence |πt| =
∑
a∈A |πt,a| =
∑
{t,a}∈E(T ) α(t, a) for every t ∈ T (i)
and |π−1(a)| =
∑
t∈T (N) |πt,a| =
∑
{t,a}∈E(T ) α({t, a}). Since π is compatible with Q we obtain that
πt = |Nt| for every t ∈ Q and hence α(t) = |Nt| ∈ λ(t). Moreover for every t ∈ T (N) \ Q it holds
that πt < |Nt| and hence α(t) ∈ λ(t). Because π is an individually rational assignment, it holds that
|π−1(a)| ∈
⋂
t∈T (π−1(a)) P
′
t(a) and thus
∑
{t,a}∈E(T ) α({t, a}) ∈ λ(a), as required.
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We are now ready to establish Theorem 6.
Proof of Theorem 6. Let I = (N,A, (Pn)n∈N ) be the given instance of SGASP. It follows from Lemma 9
that it suffices to decide whether I has an acyclic stable assignment. Observe that every acyclic stable
assignment π is compatible with PE(I, π) and the acyclic bipartite graph GI(π). Hence there is an acyclic
stable assignment π if and only if there is a setQ ⊆ T (N) and an acyclic bipartite graph G with bi-partition
{T (N), A} compatible with Q such that there is a stable assignment for I modelled by G and compatible
with Q.
Consequently, we can determine the existence of a stable assignment for I by first branching over every
Q ⊆ T (N), then over every acyclic bipartite graph G with bi-partition {T (N), A} compatible with Q, and
checking whether I has a stable assignment that is compatible with Q and modelled by G. Since there are
2|T (N)| many subsets Q of T (N) and at most 2|T (N)|·|A| (acyclic) bipartite graphs G, and we can determine
whether I has a stable assignment compatible with Q and modelled by G in time O
(
(|N | + |A|)2|N |2
)
(see Lemma 11), it follows that the total running time of the algorithm is at most O
(
2|T (N)|(1+|A|)(|N | +
|A|)2|N |2
)
.
5 Result 2: Lower Bound for SGASP
In this subsection we complement Theorem 6 by showing that if we drop the number of activities in the
parameterization, then SGASP becomes W[1]-hard. We achieve this via a parameterized reduction from
SMPSS that we have shown to be strongly W[1]-hard in Theorem 5.
Theorem 12. SGASP is W[1]-hard parameterized by the number of agent types.
Proof. Let (d, t¯,P) with P = (P1, . . . , Pm) be an instance of SMPSS. Because SMPSS is strongly
W[1]-hard, we can assume that all numbers of the instance (d, t¯,P), i.e., the values of all components
of the vectors in {t¯} ∪
⋃
P∈P P , are encoded in unary. We will also assume that all non-zero components
of the vectors {t¯} ∪
⋃
P∈P P are at least 3 (this can for instance be achieved by multiplying every vector
in {t¯} ∪
⋃
P∈P P with the number 3). We will now construct the instance I = (N,A, (Pn)n∈N ) of SGASP
in polynomial time with |T (I)| = d + 3 such that (d, t¯,P) has a solution if and only if so does I . I has
one agent type ti for every 1 ≤ i ≤ d that comes with t¯[i] agents as well as three additional agent types tP ,
t16=∅, and t
2
6=∅ having one agent each. The last three agent types will be employed to ensure that every agent
type ti must be perfectly assigned and every activity must be non-empty. Moreover, I has one activity aℓ
for every ℓ with 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ m as well as one activity aP , which will be used in conjunction with the agent
type tP to ensure that all agent types ti must be perfectly assigned. The approval set for the agent type ti
w.r.t. an activity aℓ is given by Pti(aℓ) = { v¯[i] | v¯ ∈ Pℓ ∧ v¯[i] 6= 0 }. Note that because all sets in P are
simple, it holds that Pti(aℓ)∩Ptj (aℓ) = ∅ for every i, j, and ℓ with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ d, j 6= i, and 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ m and
hence every such activity aℓ is populated by agents of at most one type in any individual rational assignment
for I . Finally, we set Pti(aP ) = {2} for every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ d, PtP (aP ) = {1, 3}, Pt1
6=∅
(a) = {1} and
Pt2
6=∅
(a) = {2} for every activity a ∈ A \ {aP }. Note that indeed |T (I)| = d+ 3 and I can be constructed
in polynomial-time (recall that we assumed that all numbers of (d, t¯,P) are encoded in unary). It remains
to show that (d, t¯,P) has a solution if and only if so does I .
Towards showing the forward direction, let p¯1, . . . , p¯m with p¯ℓ ∈ Pℓ and
∑m
ℓ=1 p¯ℓ = t¯ be a solution for
(d, t¯,P). Let π : N → A∗ be the assignment defined as follows:
• For every agent type ti and every vector p¯ℓ such that p¯ℓ[i] 6= ∅, π assigns exactly p¯ℓ[i] agents to activity
aj .
• π(nP ) = {aP }, where nP is the unique agent of type tP ,
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• π(n16=∅) = π(n
2
6=∅) = a∅, where n
1
6=∅ and n
2
6=∅ are the unique agents having type t
1
6=∅ and t
2
6=∅, respec-
tively.
We claim that π is a stable assignment for I , which we will show using the following sequence of observa-
tions:
(O1) Due to the construction of π, we obtain that |πti,aℓ | = p¯ℓ[i] for every i and j with 1 ≤ i ≤ d and
1 ≤ ℓ ≤ m.
(O2) Because of (O1) and the fact that
∑m
ℓ=1 p¯ℓ = t¯, we obtain that |πti | = t¯[i] for every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ d.
Since furthermore I has exactly t¯[i] agents of type ti, we obtain that the agents of type ti are perfectly
assigned by π.
(O3) Because every set in P is simple, it also holds that π−1(aℓ) consists of exactly p¯ℓ[i] agents of type i,
where i is the unique non-zero component of p¯ℓ.
(O4) Since π−1(nP ) = {nP} the assignment π is stable for the agent nP .
(O5) Since π(n16=∅) = π(n
2
6=∅) = a∅ and |π
−1(a)| ≥ 2 for every activity a ∈ A \ {aP } (because of (O3)),
it holds that the assignment π is stable for the agents n16=∅ and n
2
6=∅.
(O6) Consider an agent n of type ti. Because of (O2), we have that π(n) 6= a∅. Hence π(n) = aℓ for some
ℓ with 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ m and since |π−1(aℓ)| = p¯ℓ[i] (because of (O3)), we have that |π
−1(aℓ)| ∈ Pn(aℓ),
which implies that π is a stable assignment for n.
Consequently, π is a stable assignment for I .
Towards showing the reverse direction, let π : N → A∗ be a stable assignment for I . We start by
showing that π satisfies the following two properties:
(P1) for every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ d, all agents of type ti are assigned to some activity in A \ {aP },
(P2) for every activity a ∈ A \ {aP }, it holds that π
−1(a) 6= ∅ and moreover T (π−1(a)) ⊆ {t1, . . . , td}
and |T (π−1(a))| = 1.
We will show (P1) and (P2) using the following series of claims that hold for any stable assignment π :
N → A for I:
(C1) π(n26=∅) = a∅ for the unique agent n
2
6=∅ of type t
2
6=∅,
(C2) π(n16=∅) = a∅ for the unique agent n
1
6=∅ of type t
1
6=∅,
(C3) π(nP ) = aP for the unique agent nP of type tP ,
(C4) π−1(aP ) = {nP },
Towards showing (C1), assume for the contrary that π(n26=∅) = a for some a ∈ A. Then a ∈ A \ {aP }
and |π−1(a)| = 2. However, this is not possible since n26=∅ is the only agent in I that approves size 2 for any
activity in A \ {aP }.
Towards showing (C2), assume for the contrary that π(n16=∅) = a for some a ∈ A. Then a ∈ A \ {aP }
and |π−1(a)| = 1. Moreover, because of (C1), we have that π(n26=∅) = a∅ and hence n
2
6=∅ would prefer a
over his current assignment, contradicting the stability of π.
Towards showing (C3), assume for the contrary that π(nP ) 6= aP . Then π(nP ) = a∅. Moreover, due
to the approval set of nP , it must hold that π
−1(aP ) 6= ∅. Since Pt(aP ) ∈ {∅, {2}} for every agent type
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in T (I) \ {tP }, it follows that |π
−1(aP )| = 2. However, this contradicts the stability of π, since nP would
prefer aP over his current assignment. (C4) is a direct consequence of (C3) since PnP (aP ) = {1, 3} and
moreover nP is the only agent with 3 ∈ PnP (aP ).
We are now ready to show (P1) and (P2). Towards showing (P1) assume for a contradiction that there
is an agent n whose type is in {t1, . . . , td} such that π(n) ∈ {a∅, aP }. Because of (C4), we obtain that
π(n) = a∅. Moreover, since 2 ∈ Pn(aP ) and |π
−1(aP )| = 1 (because of (C4)), it follows that n would
prefer aP over his current assignment, which contradicts the stability of π.
Towards showing (P2) assume for a contradiction that there is an activity a ∈ A\{aP }with π
−1(a) = ∅.
Consider the agent n16=∅, i.e., the only agent of type t
1
6=∅, then because of (C2), we have π(n
1
6=∅) = a∅.
Moreover, since 1 ∈ Pn1
6=∅
(a) for every a ∈ A \ {aP }, the agent n
1
6=∅ would prefer a over his current
assignment, which contradicts the stability of π. Hence π−1(a) 6= ∅ for every a ∈ A \ {aP }. Furthermore,
since the agent types in {t1, . . . , td, t
1
6=∅, t
2
6=∅} are the only types that approve of an activity in A \ {aP } and
it follows from (C1) and (C2) that neither n16=∅ nor n
2
6=∅ are assigned to an activity in A \ {aP }, we obtain
that T (π−1(a)) ⊆ {t1, . . . , td}. It remains to show that |T (π
−1(aℓ))| = 1 for every 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ m. Assume
for a contradiction that there are two distinct agent types t and t′ in {t1, . . . , td} with t, t
′ ∈ T (π−1(aℓ)).
Since π is individual rational, we obtain that |π−1(aℓ)| ∈ Pt(aℓ) and |π
−1(aℓ)| ∈ Pt′(aℓ). Hence the set
Pℓ in P contains two vectors that share the same value at their non-zero component, which contradicts our
assumption that Pℓ is a simple set. This concludes the proof for (P1) and (P2) and we are now ready to
complete the proof of the reverse direction.
Consider an activity aℓ for some 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ m. Because of (P2), we obtain that all agents in π
−1(aℓ) have
the same type say ti. Because π is stable it holds that |π
−1(aℓ)| ∈ Pti(aℓ) and hence there is a vector, say
p¯ℓ, in Pℓ with p¯ℓ[i] = |π
−1(aℓ)|. We claim that the vectors p¯1, . . . , p¯m chosen in this way form a solution for
(d, t¯,P). Consider a component i with 1 ≤ i ≤ d, then because of (P1), we obtain that
∑m
j=1 p¯j[i] is equal
to the number of agents of type ti, which in turn is equal to t¯[i] by the construction of I . Hence
∑m
j=1 p¯j = t¯
and p¯1, . . . , p¯m is a solution for (d, t¯,P).
6 Result 3: XP Algorithms for SGASP and GASP
In this section, we present our XP algorithm for GASP parameterized by the number of agent types. In
order to obtain this result, we observe that the stability of an assignment for GASP can be decided by only
considering the stability of agents that are assigned to a “minimal alternative” w.r.t. their type. We then
show that once one guesses (i.e., branches over) a minimal alternative for every agent type, the problem of
finding a stable assignment for GASP that is compatible with this guess can be reduced to the problem of
finding a perfect and individual rational assignment for a certain instance of SGASP, where one additionally
requires that certain activities are assigned to at least one agent. Our first task will hence be to obtain an XP
algorithm which can find such a perfect and individually rational assignment for SGASP.
6.1 An XP Algorithm for SGASP
The aim of this section is twofold. First of all, we obtain Lemma 13, which allows us to find certain
individually rational assignments in SGASP instances and forms a core part of our XP algorithm for GASP.
Lemma 13. Let I = (N,A, (Pn)n∈N ) be an instance of SGASP, Q ⊆ T (N), and A6=∅ ⊆ A. Then one can
decide in time O(|A| · (|N |)|T (N)|) whether I has an individual rational assignment π that is compatible
with Q such that π−1(a) 6= ∅ for every a ∈ A6=∅.
Proof. Let k = |T (N)| and r = maxt∈T (N) |Nt|. We construct an instance I
′ = (k,P, t¯) of MPSS
such that I ′ is a YES-instance if and only if I = (N,A, (Pn)n∈N ) has an individually rational assignment
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π : N → A∗ that is compatible with Q and π−1(a) 6= ∅ for every a ∈ A6=∅. Let T (N) = {t1, . . . , tk}. The
set P contains one set Pa for every activity a ∈ A, defined as follows. For every number p ∈
⋃
t∈T (N) Pt(a)
the set Pa contains the set of all vectors p¯ ∈ [r]
k
0 such that |p¯| = p and p¯[i] = 0 for every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k
such that p /∈ Pti(a). Moreover, if a /∈ A6=∅, then the set Pa additionally contains the all-zero vector 0¯. This
completes the construction of I ′.
We claim that I has an individually rational assignment π : N → A∗ that is compatible with Q and
π−1(a) 6= ∅ for every a ∈ A6=∅ if and only if the solution T for I
′ contains a vector t¯ with t¯[i] = |Nti | for
every ti ∈ Q and t¯[i] < |Nti | otherwise (i.e. for every ti ∈ T (N) \ Q). Note that establishing this claim
completes the proof of the lemma since I ′ can be constructed in time O(rk) and solved in time O(|A| · rk)
by Lemma 4.
Towards showing the forward direction, let π : N → A∗ be an individually rational assignment for I
that is compatible with Q and π−1(a) 6= ∅ for every a ∈ A6=∅. For every a ∈ A let p¯a be the vector with
p¯a[i] = |πti,a| for every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Note that if p¯a 6= 0¯ then p¯a ∈ Pa for every a ∈ A because π
is individually rational. On the other hand, if p¯a = 0¯ then a /∈ A6=∅ and so we also obtain p¯a ∈ Pa. Hence
the vector t¯ =
∑
a∈A p¯a is in the solution for I
′ and moreover t¯[i] =
∑
a∈A p¯a[i] =
∑
a∈A |πti,a| = |πti |
for every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Finally, because π is compatible with Q, we obtain that t¯[i] = |πti | = |Nti | for
every i with ti ∈ Q and also t¯[i] = |πti | < |Nti | for every i with ti ∈ T (N) \Q, as required.
Towards showing the reverse direction, assume that the solution T for I ′ contains a vector t¯ with t¯[i] =
|Nti | for every ti ∈ Q and t¯[i] < |Nti | otherwise (i.e., for every ti ∈ T (N)\Q) and for every a ∈ A let p¯a be
the vector in Pa such that
∑
a∈A p¯a = t¯. We claim that the assignment π : N → A
∗ that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k
and every a ∈ A assigns exactly p¯a[i] agents of type ti to activity a and all remaining agents to activity a∅
is an individually rational assignment for I that is compatible with Q and π−1(a) 6= ∅ for every a ∈ A6=∅.
First observe that for every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k, it holds that |πti | =
∑
a∈A |πti,a| =
∑
a∈A p¯a[i] = t¯[i]. Note
also that because t¯[i] ≤ |Nti |, i.e., there is a sufficient number of agents for every agent type, we know that
it is possible to assign the agents according to π. Since in addition it holds that t¯[i] = |Nti | if ti ∈ Q and
t¯[i] < |Nti | if ti 6∈ Q, it follows that π is compatible with Q. Moreover, because 0¯ /∈ Pa for every a ∈ A6=∅,
it also holds that |π−1(a)| =
∑
1≤i≤k |πti,a| =
∑
1≤i≤k p¯a[i] 6= 0 for every such a. It remains to show that
π is individually rational for I . By the definition of π it holds that whenever π assigns an agent of type ti
to some activity a ∈ A, then p¯a[i] 6= 0. Moreover, by the construction of I
′ it holds that if p¯a[i] 6= 0 then
|p¯a| ∈ Pti(a). Hence because |π
−1(a)| = |pa|, we obtain that |π
−1(a)| ∈ Pti(a).
As a secondary result, we can already obtain an XP algorithm for SGASP parameterized by the number
of agent types. This may also be of interest, as the obtained running time is strictly better than that of
the algorithm obtained for the more general GASP. The last thing we need for this result is the following
corollary, obtained as a direct consequence of Lemma 1 and Lemma 13.
Corollary 14. Let I = (N,A, (Pn)n∈N ) be an instance of SGASP and Q ⊆ T (N). Then one can decide
in time O(|N |2 · |A|+ |A| · (|N |)|T (N)|) whether I has a stable assignment compatible with Q.
We can now prove the following.
Theorem 15. An instance I = (N,A, (Pn)n∈N ) of SGASP can be solved in time |A| · |N |
O(|T (N)|).
Proof. Let I = (N,A, (Pn)n∈N ) be the given instance of SGASP. The algorithm loops through every
Q ⊆ T (N) and in each branch checks whether I has a stable assignment that is compatible withQ. Note that
due to Corollary 14 this can be achieved in timeO(|N |2 · |A|+ |A| ·(|N |)|T (N)|) for everyQ ⊆ T (N). Since
there are 2|T (N)| subsets of T (N), we obtain O(2|T (N)|(|N |2 · |A|+ |A| · (|N |)|T (N)|)) = |A| · |N |O(|T (N)|)
as the total running time of the algorithm.
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6.2 An XP algorithm for GASP
Our aim here is to use Lemma 13 to obtain an XP algorithm for GASP. To simplify the presentation of
our algorithm, we start by introducing the notion of an NS∗-deviations that combines and unifies individual
rationality and NS-deviations. Namely, let I = (N,A, (n)n∈N ) be a GASP instance, π : N → A
∗ be
an assignment, and n ∈ N . Then we say that n has an NS∗-deviation to an activity a′ ∈ A∗ \ {π(n)} if
(a′, |π−1(a′)| + 1) ≻T (n) (a, |π
−1(a)|). Note that in order to deal with the case that a′ = a∅, we define
(a∅, i+ 1) to be equal to (a∅, 1) for every i.
Observation 16. An assignment π for I is stable if and only if no agent n ∈ N has an NS∗-deviation to any
activity in A∗ \ {π(n)}.
Let I and π be as above and let t ∈ T (I). We denote by π∗t the set of activities πt if t is perfectly assigned
by π and πt ∪ {a∅}, otherwise. We say an activity a ∈ π
∗
t is minimal with respect to t if (a
′, |π−1(a′)|) t
(a, |π−1(a)|) for each a′ ∈ π∗t and we address the alternative (a, |π
−1(a)|) as a minimal alternative with
respect to t. The following lemma provides our first key insight, by showing that only agents assigned to a
minimal activity need to be checked for having an NS-deviation.
Lemma 17. Let π be an assignment and let n be an agent of type t that has an NS∗-deviation. Then there is
an agent n′ of type t that also has an NS∗-deviation and is assigned to a minimal activity w.r.t. t.
Proof. Let a = π(n), then because n has an NS∗-deviation, there is an activity a′ ∈ A∗ \ {a} such that
(a′, |π−1(a′)| + 1) ≻t (a, |π
−1(a)|). Let am be a minimal activity w.r.t. t. Then because (a, |π
−1(a)|) t
(am, |π
−1(am|) any agent assigned to am does also have an NS
∗-deviation to am.
The following lemma is a direct consequence of Observation 16 and Lemma 17 and allows us to char-
acterize the stability condition of an assignment in terms of minimial activities for each agent type.
Lemma 18. An assignment π for I is stable if and only if for each t ∈ T (N) and each a ∈ A∗ \ {am}, it
holds that (am, |π
−1(am)|) t (a, |π
−1(a)|+ 1), where am is a minimal activity w.r.t. t.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 17 and Observation 16 that π is not stable if and only if there is an agent n
participating in a minimal activity am w.r.t. T (n) that has an NS
∗-deviation. This implies that (a, |π−1(a)|+
1) ≻T (n) (am, |π
−1(am)|) for some a ∈ A
∗ \ {am}.
The following theorem now employs the above lemma to construct an instance I ′ of SGASP together
with a subset A6=∅ of activities such that for every function fmin : T (I) → X (or in other words for every
guess of minimal alternatives in an assignment), it holds that I has a stable assignment such that fmin(t)
is a minimal alternative w.r.t. t for every t ∈ T (I) if and only if I ′ has a perfect and individual rational
assignment π such that π−1(a) 6= ∅ for every a ∈ A6=∅. For brevity, we will say that an assignment π is
compatible with fmin if and only if fmin(t) is a minimal alternative w.r.t. t for every t ∈ T (I).
Theorem 19. Let I = (N,A, (n)n∈N ) be an instance of GASP and let fmin : T (N) → X, which
informally represents a guess of a minimal alternative for every agent type. Then one can in timeO(|N |2|A|)
construct an instance I ′ = (N,A∪{aφ}, (Pn)n∈N ) of SGASP together with a subset A6=∅ of activities such
that |T (I ′)| ≤ 2|T (I)| and I has a stable assignment compatible with fmin(t) if and only if I
′ has a perfect
individual rational assignment π with π−1(a) 6= ∅ for every a ∈ A6=∅.
Proof. As a first step we remove all alternatives fromX that violate the stability condition of an assignment
π for I having fmin(t) as a minimal alternative w.r.t. t for every t ∈ T (I) given in Lemma 18. Namely,
let X ′ be the set of alternatives obtained from X \ {(a∅, 1)} after removing all alternatives (a, i) ∈ X for
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which there is an agent type t ∈ T (I) such that (a, i + 1) ≻t fmin(t). We will also assume w.l.o.g. that
fmin(t) t (a∅, 1) and if (a∅, 1) t fmin(t) t (a∅, 1), then fmin(t) = (a∅, 1).
Note that the activity aφ of I
′ will take the place of the activity a∅ of I . We define the preferences
(Pn)n∈N for I
′ as follows. Let t ∈ T (I), let (am, im) = fmin(t) and let nt ∈ Nt be an arbitrary agent
of type t. Then we set Pnt = {(am, im)} if am 6= a∅ and Pnt = {(a∅, j) | 1 ≤ j ≤ |N | } otherwise.
Informally, this will ensure that π(nt) = am and (am, π
−1(am)) = (am, im) if am 6= a∅ and π(nt) = aφ
otherwise for any perfect assignment π for I ′.
Moreover, for every other agent n of type t, i.e., n ∈ Nt and n 6= nt, we set Pn = { (a, i) ∈
X ′ | (a, i) t fmin(t) } if am 6= a∅ and Pn = { (a, i) ∈ X
′ | (a, i) t fmin(t) } ∪ { (aφ, j) | 1 ≤ j ≤ |N | }
otherwise. Informally, this ensures that only alternatives that are at least as preferred as fmin(t) and that if
am = a∅, then the agents can be assigned to aφ for any size. Finally, the setA6=∅ contains all activities a ∈ A
for which there is an agent type t such that (a, 1) ≻t fmin(t), i.e., all activities that must be non-empty for
any stable assignment π for I .
Clearly the construction of I ′ can be achieved in time O(|N |2|A|) and moreover |T (I ′)| ≤ 2|T (I)|. It
remains to show that for every choice of fmin, I has a stable assignment π compatible with fmin(t) if and
only if I ′ has a perfect individual rational assignment π with π−1(a) 6= ∅ for every a ∈ A6=∅.
Towards showing the forward direction, let π be a stable assignment for I compatible with fmin(t).
Note that, w.l.o.g., we can assume that π(nt) = am, where (am, im) = fmin(t) for every t ∈ T (I) since
otherwise we can switch the assignment for nt with some agent that is assigned to am, which exists because
π is compatible with fmin. We claim that π1 : N → (A∪{aφ})
∗ such that for every n ∈ N , π1(n) = π(n) if
π(n) 6= a∅ and π1(n) = aφ otherwise, is a perfect individual rational assignment for I
′ such that π−11 (a) 6= ∅
for every a ∈ A6=∅. The assignment π1 is obviously perfect. Towards showing that π1 is individual rational
assume for a contradiction that there is an agent n ∈ N say of type t with π1(n) = a 6= a∅ such that
|π−11 (a)| /∈ Pn(a). If n = nt, then by our assumption on π, we have that π(n) = am and |π
−1(am)| = im,
where (am, im) = fmin(t). Hence, if am 6= a∅ then π1(n) = am and |π
−1
1 (am)| = im, which because
Pnt = {(am, im)}, implies that |π
−1
1 (am)| = im ∈ Pn(am). If, on the other hand, am = a∅, then π1(n) =
aφ, which because Pnt = { (aφ, j) | 1 ≤ j ≤ |N | } implies that |π
−1
1 (am)| = |π
−1
1 (aφ)| ∈ Pn(aφ).
Finally consider the case that n 6= nt. Note that if π1(n) = aφ, then π(n) = a∅, which implies that
(a∅, 1) = fmin(t) and hence because Pn = { (aφ, j) | 1 ≤ j ≤ |N | }, we obtain (aφ, |π
−1
1 (aφ)|) ∈ Pn.
Moreover, if π1(n) = a 6= aφ, then |π
−1
1 (a)| /∈ Pn(a) implies that either (a, |π
1
i (a)|) /∈ X
′ or fmin(t) t
(a, |π−11 (a)|) = (a, |π
−1(a)|). In the former case π is not stable and in the latter case π is not compatible
with fmin. Finally, it remains to show that π
−1
1 (a) 6= ∅ for every a ∈ A6=∅. Assume for a contradiction
that there is an activity a ∈ A6=∅ such that π
−1
1 (a) = ∅. Note that then also π
−1(a) = ∅ and because of
the definition of A6=∅ it follows that there is an agent type t such that (a, 1) ≻t fmin(t) = (am, im). But
this contradicts the stability of π since now the at least one agent assigned to the minimal activity am has an
NS∗-deviation to a in I .
Towards showing the reverse direction, let π1 be a perfect individual rational assignment for I
′ such
that π−11 (a) 6= ∅ for every a ∈ A6=∅. We claim that the assignment π with π(n) = π1(n) if π1(n) 6= aφ
and π(n) = a∅ otherwise is a stable assignment for I that is compatible with fmin; note that because π1 is
perfect it cannot be the case that π1(n) = a∅. We start by showing that π is compatible with fmin, for every
t ∈ T (I). We distinguish two cases depending on whether or not (a∅, 1) = fmin(t). If (a∅, 1) = fmin(t),
then Pnt = { (aφ, j) | 1 ≤ j ≤ |N | } and hence because π1 is perfect, we obtain that π1(nt) = aφ.
It follows that π(nt) = a∅, which implies that fmin = (a∅, 1) is activated in π. Finally, because Pn =
{ (a, i) ∈ X ′ | (a, i) t fmin(t) } ∪ { (aφ, j) | 1 ≤ j ≤ |N | } for every n ∈ Nt with n 6= nt, it holds
that if π1(n) = a 6= aφ, then (a, |π
−1
1 (a)|) = (a, |π
−1(a)|) t fmin(t), as required. If, on the other
hand, (am, im) = fmin(t) and am 6= a∅, then because Pnt = {(am, im)}, we have that π(nt) = am and
|π−1(am)| = im and hence fmin(t) is activated in π. Moreover, for every n ∈ Nt with n 6= nt, we obtain
that π1(n) 6= a∅ and π1(n) 6= aφ, because π1 is perfect and Pn = { (a, i) ∈ X
′ | (a, i) t fmin(t) }. Hence
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(π(n), |π−1(π(n))|) = (π1(n), |π
−1
1 (π1(n))|) and since (π1(n), |π
−1
1 (π1(n))|) ∈ { (a, i) ∈ X
′ | (a, i) t
fmin(t) }, we obtain that (π(n), |π
−1(π(n))|) t fmin(t), as required.
Towards showing that π is also stable assume for a contradiction that this is not the case, then because
of Lemma 18 there is an agent type t and an activity a ∈ A∗ \ {am} such that (a, |π
−1(a)| + 1) ≻t
fmin = (am, im). Note that if |π
−1(a)| = 0, then a ∈ A6=∅ contradicting our assumption that π
−1
1 (a) 6= ∅
for every a ∈ A6=∅. Moreover, if a = a∅, then this contradicts our assumption that fmin(t) t (a∅, 1).
Hence a 6= a∅ and |π
−1(a)| 6= 0, which implies that there is an agent n with π(n) = a and furthermore
π(n) = π1(n). But then, because π1 is individual rational, we obtain that (|π
−1
1 (a)|) ∈ Pn(a), which
implies that (a, |π−11 (a)|) ∈ X
′ contradicting our choice of X ′.
We can now proceed to the main result of this section.
Theorem 20. An instance I = (N,A, (n)n∈N ) of GASP can be solved in time (|A| · |N |)
O(|T (I)|).
Proof. Given an instance I = (N,A, (n)n∈N ) of GASP, the algorithm enumerates all of the at most
(|A| · |N |)|T (I)| possible functions fmin and for each such function fmin the algorithm uses Theorem 19 to
construct the instance I ′ = (N,A ∪ {aφ}, (Pn)n∈N ) of SGASP with |T (I
′)| ≤ |T (I)| together with the set
A6=∅ of activities in time O(|N |
2|A|). It then uses Lemma 13 to decide whether I ′ has a perfect individual
rational assignment π1 such that π
−1
1 (a) 6= ∅ for every a ∈ A6=∅ in time O((|A| + 1)(|N |)
|T (I′)|) =
O((|A|+1)(|N |2|T (I)|). If this is true for at least one of the functions fmin, the algorithm returns that I has
a solution, otherwise the algorithm correctly returns that I has no solution. The total running time of the
algorithm is hence O(|A||T (I)| · |N |2|T (I)|) = (|A| · |N |)O(|T (I)|).
7 Result 4: Lower Bound for GASP
This section presents our hardness result for GASP. In particular, we show that GASP is unlikely to be
fixed-parameter tractable parameterized by both the number of activities and the number of agent types.
Theorem 21. GASP is W[1]-hard parameterized by the number of activities and the number of agent types.
Proof. We will employ a parameterized reduction from the PARTITIONED CLIQUE problem, which is well-
known to be W[1]-complete [21].
PARTITIONED CLIQUE
Input: An integer k, a k-partite graph G = (V,E) with partition {V1, . . . , Vk} of V into
sets of equal size.
Parameter: k
Question: Does G have a k-clique, i.e., a set C ⊆ V of k vertices such that ∀u, v ∈ C , with
u 6= v there is an edge {u, v} ∈ E?
We denote by Ei,j the set of edges of G that have one endpoint in Vi and one endpoint in Vj and we
assume w.l.o.g. that |Vi| = n and |Ei,j| = m for every i and j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k (see the standard
parameterized complexity textbook for a justification of these assumptions [2]).
Given an instance (G, k) of PARTITIONED CLIQUE with partition V1, . . . , Vk, we construct an equivalent
instance I = (N,A, (n)n∈N ) of GASP in polynomial time with
(
k
2
)
+ k activities and 2k + 1 agent types.
The instance I has the following activities:
• For every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k the activity ai, whose size in a stable assignment for I will be used to
identify the vertex in Vi chosen to be part of a k-clique in G.
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• For every i and j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k the activity ai,j , whose size in a stable assignment for I will be
used to identify the edge in Ei,j chosen to be part of a k-clique in G.
For every i and j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k let αi be a bijection from Vi to the set {3, 5, . . . , 2(n−1)+1, 2n+1}
and similarly let αi,j be a bijection from Ei,j to the set {1, 3, . . . , 2m − 1}. The main ideas behind the
reduction are as follows. First the reduction ensures that for every stable assignment π : N → A∗ for
I the size s = |π−1(ai)| of activity ai uniquely identifies a vertex in Vi, i.e., the vertex α
−1
i (s), and the
size s = |π−1(ai,j)| of activity ai,j uniquely identifies an edge in Ei,j , i.e., the edge α
−1
i,j (s). Employing a
set of “special agents” and their associated preference lists, the reduction will then ensure that the vertices
identified by the sizes of the activities a1, . . . , ak are endpoints of all the edges identified by the sizes of the
activities a1,2, a1,3, . . . , ak−1,k, which implies that these vertices form a k-clique in G.
For a pair i, j of numbers, we denote by o(i, j), the (ordered) pair i, j if i ≤ j and the (ordered) pair j, i
otherwise. We will now introduce the equivalence classes required for the definition of our preference lists.
Namely, we define the following equivalence classes:
• For x ∈ {1, 2} we define the set CxA = { (ai, x) | 1 ≤ i ≤ k },
• For every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k, we define the following sets:
– CV (i) = { (ai, αi(v)) | v ∈ Vi },
– C+1V (i) = { (ai, αi(v) + 1) | v ∈ Vi },
• For every i and j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, we define the set CE(i, j) = { (ai,j , αi,j(e)) | e ∈ Ei,j },
• For every i and v ∈ Vi, we define the set CI(i, v) = { (ai, αi(v)) } ∪ { (ao(i,j), αo(i,j)(e) + 1) | 1 ≤
j ≤ k ∧ j 6= i ∧ e ∈ Ei,j ∧ v ∈ e }, i.e., CV (i, v) contains the tuple (ai, α(v)) and all tuples
(ao(i,j), αo(i,j)(e) + 1) such that j 6= i and the edge e ∈ Eo(i,j) is incident to v.
Now ready to define the required preference lists. When defining a preference list we will only list the
equivalence classes that are more or equally preferred to the alternative (a∅, 1) and assume that all remaining
alternatives, i.e., all alternatives that are not listed, are less preferred than (a∅, 1).
• The validity preference list, denoted by PVAL, defined as CV ∪CE > C
2
A > C
1
A > (a∅, 1). Informally,
PVAL is crucial in ensuring that |π
−1(ai)| ∈ {αi(v) | v ∈ Vi } and |π
−1(ai,j)| ∈ {αi,j(e) | e ∈ Ei,j }
for every stable assignment π for I and every i and j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k.
• For every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k, let v1, . . . , vu be the unique ordering of the vertices in Vi in ascending
order w.r.t. αi. We define the following two preference lists for every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k:
– The forward-vertex preference list, denoted by P→V (i), defined as C
+1
V (i) > CI(i, vu) >
CI(i, vn−1) > · · · > CI(i, v1) > (a∅, 1). Informally, P
→
V (i) is crucial to ensure that for
every j with 1 ≤ j ≤ k and j 6= i the edge e with αo(i,j)(e) = |π
−1(ao(i,j))| is not adjacent
with any vertex v′ ∈ Vi such that αi(v
′) > αi(v) for the vertex v with αi(v) = |π
−1(ai)|. This
intuition will be made precise in Claim 1.
– The backward-vertex preference list, denoted by P←V (i), is defined as C
+1
V (i) > CI(i, v1) >
CI(i, v2) > · · · > CI(i, vu) > (a∅, 1). Informally, P
←
V (i) is crucial to ensure that for every j
with 1 ≤ j ≤ k and j 6= i the edge e with αo(i,j)(e) = |π
−1(ao(i,j))| is not adjacent with any
vertex v′ ∈ Vi such that αi(v
′) < αi(v) for the vertex v with αi(v) = |π
−1(ai)|. This intuition
will be made precise in Claim 1.
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Informally, P→V (i) and P
←
V (i) together ensure that for every j with 1 ≤ j ≤ k and j 6= i, the edge e
with αo(i,j)(e) = |π
−1(ao(i,j))| is adjacent with the vertex v with αi(v) = |π
−1(ai)|. This intuition
will be made precise in Claim 1
We are now ready to define the set N of agents:
• for every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k:
– one agent n→i with preference list P
→
V (i) and
– one agent n←i with preference list P
←
V (i).
• a set NV of
(
k
2
)
(2m− 1) + k(2n + 1) + 1 agents with preference list PVAL.
This completes the construction of the instance I . Clearly the given reduction can be achieved in polynomial-
time. Moreover, since I has exactly
(
k
2
)
+ k activities and exactly 2k + 1 distinct types of preference lists,
both parameters are bounded by a function of k, as required. It remains to show that G has a k-clique if and
only if I has a stable assignment.
Towards showing the forward direction let C = {v1, . . . , vk} be a k-clique of G such that vi ∈ Vi for
every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k and for every i and j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k let ei,j be the edge between vi and vj in
G. We claim that the assignment π : N → A∗ defined in the following is a stable assignment for I . We set:
• π(n→i ) = π(n
←
i ) = ai and
• for every i and j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, π assigns exactly αi,j(ei,j) agents from NV to activity ai,j ,
• for every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k, π assigns exactly αi(vi)− 2 agents from NV to activity ai,
• all remaining agents (which are only in NV ) are assigned to a∅.
Note that |π−1(ai,j)| = αi,j(ei,j) and |π
−1(ai)| = αi(vi)− 2 + 2 = αi(vi) for every i and j with 1 ≤ i <
j ≤ k.
Towards showing that the assignment π is stable, we consider any agent n and distinguish the following
cases:
• if n is one of n→i or n
←
i for some i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k, then π is stable w.r.t. to n because for every j
with 1 ≤ j ≤ k and j 6= i, the edge eo(i,j) is incident with vi.
• if u ∈ NV , we consider the following cases:
– (π(u) = ai) In this case the assignment is stable w.r.t. n because the tuple (ai, |π
−1(ai)|) =
(ai, αi(vi)) is in the largest equivalence class of PV .
– (π(u) = ai,j) In this case the assignment is stable w.r.t. n because the tuple (ai,j , |π−1(ai,j)|) =
(ai,j , αi,j(ei,j)) is in the largest equivalence class of PV .
– (π(u) = a∅) In this case the assignment is stable w.r.t. n because the tuples (ai, |π
−1(ai)|+1) =
(ai, αi(vi)+1) and (ai,j , |π
−1(ai,j)|+1) = (ai,j, αi,j(ei,j)+1) are less preferred than the tuple
(a∅, 1) in the preference list PV for n (for every i and j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k).
Towards showing the backward direction, we start by formalizing the intuition given above about the
preference lists P→V (i) and P
→
V (i).
Claim 1. Let i be an integer with 1 ≤ i ≤ k and let π be a stable assignment for I satisfying:
(A1) |π−1(ai)| ∈ {αi(v) | v ∈ Vi } and
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(A2) for every j with 1 ≤ j ≤ k and j 6= i it holds that |π−1(ao(i,j))| ∈ {αo(i,j)(e) | e ∈ Eo(i,j) }.
Then the following holds for π:
(C1) π(n→i ) = π(n
←
i ) = ai.
(C2) For every j with 1 ≤ j ≤ k and j 6= i, the unique edge eo(i,j) ∈ Eo(i,j) with αo(i,j)(e) = |π
−1(ao(i,j))|
is incident with the unique vertex v ∈ Vi such that α(v) = |π
−1(ao(i,j))|.
Towards showing (C1) assume for a contradiction that this is not the case, i.e., one of the agents n→i or
n←i , in the following denoted by n is not assigned to ai. Because (ai, α(v) + 1) ∈ C
+1
V (i) and C
+1
V (i) only
contains alternatives for activity ai, the agent n would prefer to change from his current activity to activity
ai contradicting our assumption that π is stable.
Towards showing (C2) assume for a contradiction that this is not the case and let j be an index witnessing
this, i.e., v /∈ eo(i,j). Let v
′ be the vertex in Vi that is incident with eo(i,j). We distinguish two analogous
cases (note that v′ 6= v): (1) α(v′) > α(v) and (2) α(v′) < α(v). In the former case π would not be
stable because the agent n→i would prefer to join activity ai,j over his current activity ai; this is because
α(v′) > α(v) and hence the equivalence class CI(i, v
′), which contains the tuple (ao(i,j), αo(i,j)(e) + 1),
is more preferred in P→V (i) than the equivalence class CI(i, v), which contains the tuple (ai, αi(v)). The
proof for the latter case is analogous, using the agent n←i instead of the agent n
→
i .
Note that once we show that the assumptions (A1) and (A2) hold for every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k, property
(C2) ensures that the vertices α−1(|π−1(a1)|), . . . , α
−1(|π−1(ak)|) form a k-clique in G. This is achieved
with the following claim.
Claim 2. For every stable assignment π : N → A∗ for I , it holds that:
(A0) π(u) = a∅ for at least one agent u ∈ NV .
(A1) π−1(ai) ∈ {αi(v) | v ∈ Vi } for every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
(A2) π−1(ai,j) ∈ {αi,j(e) | e ∈ Ei,j } for every i and j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k.
Towards showing (A0), assume for a contradiction that this is not the case, i.e., all
(
k
2
)
(2m−1)+k(2n+
1) + 1 agents in NV are assigned to one of the
(
k
2
)
+ k activities in A. Then there either exists an activity
ai,j such that more than 2m − 1 agents in NV are assigned to ai,j by π or there exists an activity ai such
that more than 2n+1 agents in NV are assigned to ai by π. In the former case let u ∈ NV be an agent with
π(u) = ai,j . Then the assignment is not stable because n would prefer being assigned to a∅ over its current
assignment to ai,j . The latter case is analogous. This completes the proof for (A0).
Because of (A0) there is at least one agent u ∈ NV such that π(u) = a∅. Hence because of the
preference list PV for n, we obtain that |π
−1(ai)| /∈ {0, 1, 2} ∪ {αi(v) − 1 | v ∈ Vi }, since otherwise
n would prefer activity ai over a∅. It follows that either |π
−1(ai)| ∈ {αi(v) | v ∈ Vi } or |π
−1(ai)| >
max{αi(v) }v ∈ Vi } = 2n+1. In the former case (A1) holds, so assume that the latter case applies. Since
we can assume w.l.o.g. that 2n + 1 > 2k (and there are only 2k agents in N \NV ), we obtain that there is
at least one agent u ∈ NV such that π(u) = ai. But then because of the preference list PV of n, n would
prefer activity a∅ over ai, contradicting our assumption that π is a stable assignment. The completes the
proof of (A1). The proof of (A2) is analogous to the proof of (A1).
8 Result 5: Lower Bound for gGASP
From our previous result in conjunction with the equivalence between GASP and gGASP on complete net-
works, we can immediately conclude that gGASP is also W[1]-hard parameterized by the number of agent
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types and the number of activities. However, here we strengthen this result by showing that the problem
remains W[1]-hard even when one additionally parameterizes by the vertex cover number of the network.
As noted in the introduction, this also implies the W[1]-hardness of the problem when parameterized by the
treewidth of the network, a question raised in previous work [15]; in fact, the presented lower-bound result
not only shows the (conditional) fixed-parameter intractability of the problem with a more restrictive graph
parameter, but also when additionally parameterizing by the number of agent types.
Theorem 22. gGASP is W[1]-hard parameterized by the number of activities, the number of agent types,
and the vertex cover number of the network.
Proof. The proof is via a parameterized reduction from PARTITIONED CLIQUE, i.e., given an instance
(G, k) of PARTITIONED CLIQUE with partition V1, . . . , Vk, we construct an equivalent instance I =
(N,A, (n)n∈N , L) of gGASP in polynomial time with
(
k
2
)
+ k activities,
(
k
2
)
+3k agent types, and whose
network (N,L) has vertex cover number at most
(
k
2
)
+ 2k.
The main ideas behind the reduction are quite similar to the reduction used in the proof of Theorem 21.
The main differences is that to ensure that the network (N,L) has a small vertex cover number, it is necessary
to split the set NV of agents used in the previous reduction, into sets Ni and Ni,j for every i and j with
1 ≤ i < j ≤ k such that the agents in a set Ni can only be assigned to activity ai (or a∅) and the agents
in a set Ni,j can only be assigned to activity ai,j (or a∅). This way the agents n
→
i and n
←
i only need to be
connected to agents in Ni and Ni,j (for any j 6= i) but not with all agents in NV .
Let I ′ be the instance of GASP as defined in the proof of Theorem 21. Since the instance I is defined
quite similar to the instance I ′, we will refer to I ′ for the construction of I . In particular, I has the same
activities as I ′, i.e., I has one activity ai for every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k and one activity ai,j for every i and
j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k. For every i and j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k let αi be a bijection from Vi to the set
{3, 5, . . . , 2(n− 1)+ 1, 2n+1} and similarly let αi,j be a bijection from Ei,j to the set {3, 5, . . . , 2m+1}.
Note that αi and αi,j are defined almost the same as in the proof of Theorem 21, the only difference being
the definition of the image αi,j , which is now {3, 5, . . . , 2m+ 1} instead of {1, 3, . . . , 2m− 1}.
For the definition of the preference lists, we will mainly use the equivalence classes defined in the proof
of Theorem 21, i.e., the classes CV (i), C
+1
V , CE(i, j), and CI(i, v). Apart from those we will also need
a slightly modified version of the equivalence class C+1V (i), which we denote by CV+1, 2(i) and set to
{(ai, 2)} ∪ C
+1
V (i). We are now ready to define the preference lists, required by the reduction.
• For every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k, let v1, . . . , vu be the unique ordering of the vertices in Vi in ascending
order w.r.t. αi. We define the following two preference lists for every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k:
– The vertex-validity preference list, denoted by P VVAL(i), defined as CV (i) > (ai, 2) > (ai, 1) >
(a∅, 1).
– The forward-vertex preference list, denoted by P→V (i), defined as C
+1,2
V (i) > CI(i, vu) >
CI(i, vn−1) > · · · > CI(i, v1) > (a∅, 1).
– The backward-vertex preference list, denoted by P←V (i), defined as C
+1,2
V (i) > CI(i, v1) >
CI(i, v2) > · · · > CI(i, vu) > (a∅, 1).
• For every i and j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k the edge-validity preference list, denoted by PEVAL(i, j), and
defined as CE(i, j) > (ai,j, 2) > (ai,j, 1) > (a∅, 1).
We are now ready to define the set N of agents:
• for every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k:
– one agent n→i with preference list P
→
V (i),
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n→1
N1 n
←
1
n1,2
N1,2
n→2
N2 n
←
2
n1,3
N1,3
n→3
N3 n
←
3
n2,3
N2,3
Figure 2: An illustration of the network (N,L) obtained in the reduction of Theorem 22 for the case that k = 3.
– one agent n←i with preference list P
←
V (i), and
– a set Ni of 2n + 3 agents with preference list P
V
VAL(i).
• for every i and j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, a set Ni,j of 2m + 3 agents with preference list P
E
VAL(i, j). In
the following let ni,j be one of the agents in Ni,j .
Finally, the links L between the agents are given by:
• for every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k:
– a link between n→i and n
←
i ,
– for every u ∈ Ni a link between n
→
i and n,
– for every j with 1 ≤ j ≤ k and j 6= k a link between n→i and no(i,j),
• for every i, j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k and every u ∈ Ni,j \ {ni,j} a link between ni,j and n.
An illustration of the network (N,L) as defined above is given in Figure 2.
This completes the construction of the instance I . Observe that the set {n→i , n
←
i | 1 ≤ i ≤
k } ∪ {ni,j | 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k } is a vertex cover of the network (N,L) of size at most
(
k
2
)
+ 2k, and
hence the network has vertex cover number at most
(
k
2
)
+ 2k. Clearly the given reduction can be achieved
in polynomial-time. Moreover, since I has exactly
(
k
2
)
+ k activities, exactly
(
k
2
)
+ 3k distinct types of
preference lists, and the vertex cover number of the network (N,L) is at most
(
k
2
)
+ 2k, all parameters are
bounded by a function of k, as required. It remains to show that G has a k-clique if and only if I has a
stable assignment. Towards showing the forward direction let C = {v1, . . . , vk} be a k-clique of G such
that vi ∈ Vi for every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k and for every i and j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k let ei,j be the edge between
vi and vj in G. We claim that the assignment π : N → A
∗ defined in the following is a stable assignment
for I . We set:
• π(n→i ) = π(n
←
i ) = ai,
• for every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k, π assigns exactly αi(vi)− 2 agents from Ni to activity ai,
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• for every i and j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, π(ni,j) = ai,j , and
• for every i and j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, π assigns exactly αi,j(ei,j)− 1 agents from Ni,j to activity ai,j ,
• all remaining agents are assigned to a∅.
Note that for every i and j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k the agents assigned to activities ai and ai,j are connected
and moreover |π−1(ai,j)| = αi,j(ei,j) and |π
−1(ai)| = αi(vi). Let n be an agent, we consider the following
cases:
• if n is one of n→i or n
←
i for some i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k, then the assignment π is stable w.r.t. to n because
for every j with 1 ≤ j ≤ k and j 6= i, the edge eo(i,j) is incident to vi in G and hence the tuples
(ai, αi(vi)) and (ao(i,j), αo(i,j)(eo(i,j)) + 1) are in the same equivalence class of P
→
V and P
←
V .
• if u ∈ Ni and π(u) = ai, then the assignment π is stable w.r.t. n because the tuple (ai, αi(vi)) is in
the most preferred equivalence class of P VVAL(i).
• if u ∈ Ni and π(u) = a∅, then the assignment π is stable w.r.t. n because (a∅, 1) is preferred to
(ai, αi(vi) + 1) as well as to any tuple with any other activity in P
V
VAL(i).
• if u ∈ Ni,j and π(u) = ai,j , then the assignment π is stable w.r.t. n because the the tuple
(ai,j , αi,j(ei,j)) is in the most preferred equivalence class of P
E
VAL(i, j).
• if u ∈ Ni,j and π(u) = a∅, then the assignment π is stable w.r.t. n because (a∅, 1) is preferred to
(ai,j , αi,j(ei,j) + 1) as well as to any tuple with any other activity in P
E
VAL(i, j).
The reverse direction follows immediately from the following claim.
Claim 3. For every stable assignment π : N → A∗ for I , it holds that:
(C1) for every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k, there is an agent u ∈ Ni such that π(u) = (a∅, 1),
(C2) for every i and j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, there is an agent u ∈ Ni,j such that π(u) = (a∅, 1),
(C3) |π−1(ai)| ∈ {αi(v) | v ∈ Vi } for every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
(C4) π(n→i ) = π(n
←
i ) = ai for every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
(C5) |π−1(ai,j)| ∈ {αi,j(e) | e ∈ Ei,j } for every i and j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k,
(C6) π(ni,j) = ai,j for every i and j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k,
(C7) α−1i (|π
−1(ai)|) ∈ α
−1
o(i,j)(|π
−1(ao(i,j))|) for every i and j with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k and i 6= j.
Towards showing (C1) suppose for a contradiction that this is not the case. Then because all agents in
Ni must either be assigned to ai or a∅ by π, we obtain that all 2n + 3 agents in Ni must be assigned to ai.
However such an assignment would not be stable because any tuple (ai, x) with x ≥ 2n+3 is less preferred
than (a∅, 1) in every preference list.
The proof of (C2) is very similar to the proof of (C1). Namely, suppose for a contradiction that this is
not the case. Then all 2m + 3 agents in Ni,j must be assigned to ai,j , however such an assignment would
not be stable because any tuple (ai,j, x) with x ≥ 2m + 3 is less preferred than (a∅, 1) in every preference
list.
Towards showing (C3) we first show that |π−1(ai)| > 1. Because of (C1) there is an agent u ∈ Ni with
π(u) = ∅. Hence |π−1(ai)| 6= 0 since otherwise the agent n would prefer to switch to ai. Now suppose for
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a contradiction that |π−1(ai)| = 1. Because the agents in Ni are the only agents that prefer the tuple (ai, 1)
over (a∅, 1), it holds that π
−1(ai) ⊆ Ni. But since the tuple (ai, 2) is a tuple that is in the highest equivalence
class C+1,2V (i) of the preference list P
→
i for n
→
i and n
→
i is linked with every vertex in Ni, the agent n
→
i
would prefer to switch to ai, contradicting our assumption that π is stable. Consequently |π
−1(ai)| > 1 and
we show next that π−1(ai) contains n
→
i . Observe that the agents in {n
←
i , n
→
i } ∪Ni are the only agents in
N that can be assigned to ai; all other agents prefer the tuple (a∅, 1) over any tuple involving the activity ai.
Since |π−1(ai)| > 1 the set π
−1(ai) can only be connected if it contains n
→
i . Hence we have |π
−1(ai)| > 1
and n→i ∈ π
−1(ai). Because of (C1) there is an agent u ∈ Ni with π(u) = a∅. Since n is linked with
n→i and prefers ai over a∅, whenever |π
−1(ai)| ∈ {0, 1} ∪ {αi(v) − 1 | v ∈ Vi } = {0, 1, 2, 4, 6, . . . , 2n},
we obtain that either |π−1(ai)| ∈ {αi(v) | v ∈ Vi } = {3, 5, . . . , 2n + 1} or |π
−1(ai)| > 2n + 1. In the
former case (C3) holds, so assume that the latter case applies. Since the agents in {n←i , n
→
i } ∪ Ni are the
only agents in N that can be assigned to ai and we can assume w.l.o.g. that 2n + 1 > 2, we obtain that
there is at least one agent u ∈ Ni such that π(u) = ai. But then because of the preference list PV (i) of n, n
would prefer activity a∅ over ai, contradicting our assumption that π is a stable assignment. The completes
the proof of (C3).
Towards showing (C5) first observe that the agents in {n←i , n
→
i | 1 ≤ i ≤ k} ∪Ni,j are the only agents
inN that can be assigned to ai,j; all other agents prefer the tuple (a∅, 1) over any tuple involving the activity
ai,j . Moreover because of (C4), we obtain that only the agents in Ni,j can actually be assigned to ai,j .
Moreover because all agents inNi,j must either be assigned to ai,j or to a∅ and due to (C2) there is always an
agent n′ ∈ Ni,j with π(n
′) = a∅, and since the set Ni,j is connected by L, we obtain that there is always an
agent n ∈ Ni,j with π(u) = a∅ that is linked to an agent in π
−1(ai,j). Hence it follows from the preference
list PE(i, j) of the agents in Ni,j that |π
−1(ai,j)| /∈ {0, 1} ∪ {αi,j(e) − 1 | e ∈ Ei,j }, since otherwise the
agent nwould prefer to switch to ai,j . Hence either |π
−1(ai,j)| ∈ {αi,j(e) | e ∈ Ei,j } = {3, 5, . . . , 2m+1}
or |π−1(ai,j)| > 2m+1. In the former case (C5) holds, so assume that the latter case applies. Then there is
an agent u ∈ Ni,j with π(u) = ai,j , but since |π
−1(ai,j)| > 2m + 1 the agent would prefer to be assigned
to a∅, contradicting our assumption that the assignment π is stable. This completes the proof of (C5).
(C6) can be obtained as follows. Because of (C4), we have that |π−1(ai,j)| ≥ 3. Since (as observed
already in the proof of (C5)) only the agents inNi,j can be assigned to activity ai,j , we obtain that π(ni,j) =
ai,j since otherwise π
−1(ai,j) would not be connected.
Towards showing (C7) assume for a contradiction that there are i and j with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k and i 6= j
such that v /∈ e, where v = α−1i (|π
−1(ai)|) and e = αo(i,j)(|π
−1(ao(i,j)). Observe first that because of
(C3) and (C4) v and e are properly defined and moreover v ∈ Vi and e ∈ Ei,j . Let v
′ be the endpoint of
e in Vi, which because v /∈ e is not equal to v. We distinguish two analogous cases: (1) αi(v
′) < αi(v)
and (2) αi(v
′) > αi(v). In the former case consider the agent n
←
i . Because of (C4) and (C6), it holds
that π(n←i ) = ai and π(ni,j) = ao(i,j), which implies that n
←
i is linked with an agent, namely the agent
ni,j assigned to ao(i,j) by π. Together with the facts that the equivalence class CI(i, v
′) contains the tuple
(ao(i,j), α(e)), the equivalence class CI(i, v) contains the tuple (ai, α(v)), and CE(i, v
′) is preferred over
CE(i, v) in the preference list for n
←
i , we obtain that the agent n
←
i prefers the activity ao(i,j) over its current
activity ai, contradicting the stability of π. The proof for the latter case is analogous using the agent n
→
i
instead of the agent n←i . This completes the proof for (C7).
9 Conclusion
We obtained a comprehensive picture of the parameterized complexity of Group Activity Selection problems
parameterized by the number of agent types, both with and without the number of activities as an additional
parameter. Our positive results suggest that using the number of agent types is a highly appealing parameter
for GASP and its variants; indeed, this parameter will often be much smaller than the number of agents due to
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the way preference lists are collected or estimated (as also argued in initial work on GASP [6]). For instance,
in the large-scale event management setting of GASP (or SGASP), one would expect that preference lists for
event participants are collected via simple questionnaires—and so the number of agent types would remain
fairly small regardless of the size of the event.
We believe that the techniques used to obtain the presented results, and especially the Subset Sum tools
developed to this end, are of broad interest to the algorithms community. For instance, MULTIDIMEN-
SIONAL SUBSET SUM (MSS) has been used as a starting point for W[1]-hardness reductions in at least
two different settings over the past year [13, 12], but the simple and partitioned variant of the problem (i.e.,
SMPSS) is much more restrictive and hence forms a strictly better starting point for any such reductions in
the future. This is also reflected in our proof of the W[1]-hardness of SMPSS, which is significantly more
involved than the analogous result for MSS. Likewise, we expect that the developed algorithms for TREE
SUBSET SUM and MULTIDIMENSIONAL PARTITIONED SUBSET SUM may find applications as subroutines
for (parameterized and/or classical) algorithms in various settings.
Note that there is now an almost complete picture of the complexity of Group Activity Selection prob-
lems w.r.t. any combination of the parameters number of agents, number of activities, and number of agent
types (see also Table 1). There is only one piece missing, namely, the parameterized complexity of SGASP
parameterized by the number of agents, which we resolve for completeness with the following theorem.
Theorem 23. SGASP is fixed-parameter tractable parameterized by the number of agents.
Proof. Let I = (N,A, (Pn)n∈N ) be a SGASP instance. The main idea behind the algorithm is to guess (i.e.,
branch over) the set M∅ of agents that are assigned to a∅ as well as a partition M of the remaining agents,
i.e., the agents in N \M∅, and then check whether there is a stable assignment π for I such that:
(P1) π−1(a∅) = M∅ and
(P2) {π−1(a) | a ∈ A } \ {∅} =M, i.e.,M corresponds to the grouping of agents into activities by π.
Since there are at most nn possibilities for M∅ and M and those can be enumerated in time O(n
n), it
remains to show how to decide whether there is a stable assignent for I satisfying (P1) and (P2) for any
givenM∅ andM. Towards showing this, we first consider the implications for a stable assignment resulting
from assigning the agents in M∅ to a∅. Namely, let P
′
n for every n ∈ N be the approval set obtained from
Pn after removing all alternatives (a, i) such that i 6= 0 and there is an agent n∅ ∈M∅ with (a, i+1) ∈ Pn∅ .
Moreover, let A6=∅ be the set of all activities that cannot be left empty if the agents in M∅ are assigned to
a∅, i.e., the set of all activities such that there is an agent n∅ ∈ M∅ with (a, 1) ∈ Pn∅ . Now consider a set
M ∈ M, and observe that the set AM of activities that the agents in M can be assigned to in any stable
assignment satisfying (P1) and (P2) is given by: AM = { a | |M | ∈
⋂
n∈M Pn(a)
′ }. Let B be the bipartite
graph having M on one side and A on the other side and having an edge between a vertex M ∈ M and a
vertex a ∈ A if a ∈ AM . We claim that I has a stable assignment satisfying (P1) and (P2) if and only if B
has a matching that saturatesM∪A6=∅. Since deciding the existence of such a matching can be achieved in
time O(
√
|V (B)||E(B)|) = O(
√
|N ∪A||N ||A|) (see e.g. [13, Lemma 4]), establishing this claim is the
last component required for the proof of the theorem.
Towards showing the forward direction, let π be a stable assignment for I satisfying (P1) and (P2). Then
O = { {a, φ−1(a)} | a ∈ A } is a matching in B that saturates M∪ A6=∅. Note that O saturates M due
to (P2), moreover, O saturates A6=∅ since otherwise there would be an activity a ∈ A6=∅ with π
−1(a) = ∅,
which due to the definition of A6=∅ and (P1) implies there is an agent n with π(n) = a∅ such that 1 ∈ Pn(a),
contradicting our assumption that π is stable.
Towards showing the reverse direction, let O be a matching in B that saturates M ∪ A. Then the
assignment π mapping all agents in M (for every M ∈ M) to its partner in O and all other agents to a∅
clearly already satisfies (P1) and (P2). It remains to show that it is also stable. Note that π is individually
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rational because of the construction of B. Moreover, assume for a contradiction that there is an agent
n ∈ N∅ with π(n) = a∅ and an activity a ∈ A such that (a, |π
−1(a)| + 1) ∈ Pn. If |π
−1(a)| = 0,
then a ∈ A6=∅ and hence |π
−1(a)| > 0 (because O saturates A6=∅), a contradiction. If on the other hand
|π−1(a)| 6= 0, then {M,a} ∈ O (for some M ∈ M), but (a, |π−1(a)|) /∈ P ′n and hence {M,a} /∈ E(B),
also a contradiction.
For future work, we believe that it would be interesting to see how the complexity map changes if one
were to consider the number of activity types instead of the number of activities in our parameterizations.
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